




**President Reagan's
Legislative Touch**
Matthew N. Beckmann
University of California, Irvine



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SCHOOL OF POLICY, PLANNING, AND DEVELOPMENT
USC BEDROSIAN CENTER ON GOVERNANCE AND THE PUBLIC ENTERPRISE
RALPH AND GOLDY LEWIS HALL, SUITE 201
LOS ANGELES, CA 90089-0626
WWW.USC.EDU/SPPD/BEDROSIAN

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Washington remembers the 1981 tax bill as a model of presidential leadership in lawmaking. Promoting an ambitious initiative before an antagonistic Congress, President Reagan did not just pass *a* tax cut, he passed *his* tax cut, thereby turning a bold initiative into a landmark law. Like any extraordinary case, however, it is unclear what, if any, general lessons are captured by President Reagan's experiences during the '81 tax cut debate. Was this an isolated, idiosyncratic legislative victory or an exemplar of president-led coalition-building on Capitol Hill? Here I step back from particular anecdotes to situate President Reagan's policymaking context relative to other postwar presidents, explore his effort given that baseline, and examine the results. What we find is that President Reagan's influence on Capitol Hill was real, often substantial, but neither unprecedented nor unrivaled. Like presidents before and after, Ronald Reagan harnessed his office's lobbying arsenal to good effect.

One of Ronald Reagan's most iconic moments as president came in his first summer, just days before the House's decisive vote on his signature tax cut proposal. It was then that President Reagan addressed the nation seeking support from citizens and, more importantly, their representatives in Congress. In a live, primetime Oval Office television address, the President made his case:

In a few days the Congress will stand at the fork of two roads. One road is all too familiar to us. It leads ultimately to higher taxes. It merely brings us full circle back to the source of our economic problems, where the government decides that it knows better than you what should be done with your earnings and, in fact, how you should conduct your life. The other road promises to renew the American spirit. It's a road of hope and opportunity. It places the direction of your life back in your hands where it belongs. (7/27/1981)

The President closed by encouraging Americans' vocal support. "It's been the power of millions of people like you who have determined that we will make America great again. You have made the difference up to now. You will make the difference again. Let us not stop now."

Considering the President's penchant for anticipating his audience's reaction, Reagan must have been elated on the walk back to the White House residence. For the public's favorable response was both swift and overwhelming, with the *Washington Post* headline telling the story: "President's Speech has Hill Switchboard Ablaze." From Barbara Mikulski (D-MD) to Ken Holland (D-SC), Democrats North to South declared their offices flooded by calls and letters in support of the President and his plan. Rep. Carroll Hubbard Jr. (D-KY), a moderate who had previously voted against the President, offered more detail: 480 of 500 constituents who called his office did so to endorse the President's position. Hubbard's conclusion was plain: "It is obvious that the president's tax cut plan has overwhelming support in western Kentucky" (*Washington Post* 7/27/81). Rep. Charles Wilson (D-TX) was even more succinct: "Reagan just has [my constituents'] hearts" (*New York Times* 7/30/81).

Whereupon Congress reached "the fork of two roads" days later, lawmakers opted for the President's. The *New York Times* front-page story captured the sense of high-drama and high-stakes:

“With stunning victories today, the President has won congressional approval for the largest budget and tax cuts in modern American history, changes that his partisans have termed ‘the Reagan revolution,’ inviting comparisons to the early New Deal period of Franklin D. Roosevelt” (7/30/1981). Needless to say, this extraordinary triumph secured President Reagan’s last-minute speech a vaunted place as Beltway legend. In fact, the speech’s mythical status was immediately evident in the *Post*: “Both Democrats and Republicans spoke with awe of the President’s having generated public support for his tax package with his Monday night television appeal” (7/30/1981).

Yet even if it was among the last and most visible of the White House’s persuasive activities, President Reagan’s televised Oval Office address was only tip of the White House’s lobbying iceberg. Extensive behind-the-scenes lobbying contacts, coordinated by the Legislative Strategy Group (LSG), occupied White House officials, including the President, for months (see Bodnick 1990; Stockman 1986). President Reagan described his message: after explaining his plan’s widespread benefits, he would then ask, “did they have any questions, any particular concerns that I could speak to? And [when they did] I would give them what I thought was the proper answer to the questions they raised” (7/29/1981). The President and his aides assiduously kept up this “full court press” until President Reagan penned the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 into law. Like any extraordinary case, however, it is difficult to know what (if any) general lessons are captured by President Reagan’s experiences promoting and passing the Economic Recovery and Tax Act. Was this a single, idiosyncratic legislative victory or a generalizable model of president-led coalition-building on Capitol Hill? Here I step back from particular anecdotal cases to consider President Reagan’s legislative record within the broader context of other presidents, Congresses, and issues. Specifically, I situate President Reagan’s policymaking potential relative to other postwar presidents, explore his effort given that context, and examine the results. I conclude by assessing President Reagan’s legislative touch and legacy.

President Reagan in Context

Considering news' overwhelming emphasis on presidential politics (see Barrett and Peake 2007; Entman 1989; Gans 1978; Groeling 2010), it is hardly surprising that casual observers harbor high expectations for Oval Office occupants (see Cronin and Genovese 1998; Lowi 1985; Waterman and Jenkins-Smith 1999). Not only does news' president-centered narrative signal "a president is the most important actor in any event in which he takes part" (1982, 55), as Michael Schudson noted, but this personalized portrayal further reinforces bystanders' natural tendency to perceive events as resulting from individuals' traits and choices rather than as a function of institutional design, historical precedent, or purposive incentives (see Jones and Harris 1967; Sabini, Siepmann, Stein 2001; Weber, Camerer, Rottenstreich, Knez 2001).

Nowhere is this "fundamental attribution error" – i.e., the tendency to overestimate individual-level explanations and underestimate situational-level ones – more evident than in popular reflections on presidents' potential influence in Congress. Whereas ad hoc Washington theorizing regularly points to a president's "will and skill" as dispositive, systematic scholarly research reveals contemporary presidents' legislative fate is explained largely by factors beyond his control. Or, as George Edwards put it, "Often outcomes that are popularly attributed to presidential leadership (positively or negatively) are actually products of other, more powerful forces structuring the environment of executive-legislative relations" (1989, 213).

What are these "powerful forces" that mold presidents' policymaking potential? Briefly let me describe three basic elements that structure the presidential-congressional relationship (for all postwar presidents): constitutional design, congressional composition, and political circumstances.

Constitutional Design

Mimicking the Constitution's label for the chief executive's other responsibilities – e.g., "Commander in Chief" – American government textbooks often describe presidents' lawmaking role as the "Legislator in Chief." It is a misleading moniker. After all, the nation's founding fathers

were far less interested in facilitating president-led policymaking than inhibiting it. It is for this reason Article I states baldly, “All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.” The implication is clear, as Matthew Beckmann noted: “When it comes to promoting and passing their legislative agenda, the Constitution offers presidents little encouragement, less guidance, and no help” (2010, 5).

That the Constitution severely clips presidents’ legislative wings – limiting their formal powers to recommending and vetoing legislation – is why president-centered explanations of presidential leadership in lawmaking largely fail; ultimately presidents’ policymaking potential depends less on the president than on Congress. Like lawmakers, the president’s proposals must navigate Congress’ labyrinth of institutional obstacles – e.g., bicameralism, committees, calendars, leaders, filibusters, rules of order, and beyond – not to mention the legislators who control them. Of course, this was as true for President Reagan as all other presidents.

Congressional Composition

Countering earlier scholarship, which characterized presidents’ prospects largely in terms of innate character and/or personal style (Barber 1972; Burns 1965; Greenstein 1982; Neustadt 1960[1990]; Rossiter 1956; Schlesinger 1973; Sperlich 1975), more recent political scientists have downplayed presidents’ “skill” when explaining their legislative success or failure. Drawing on systematic evidence and analyses, these researchers find each president’s legislative record is better explained by Congress’ partisan and ideological breakdown than the president’s personal traits (see Barrett and Eshbaugh-Soha 2007; Beckmann 2010; Bond and Fleisher 1990; Brady and Volden 1998; Canes-Wrone 2005; Edwards 1989; Krehbiel 1998; Peterson 1990; Rudalevige 2002). Jon Bond and Richard Fleisher express the point emphatically: “Presidential success is determined in large measure by the results of the last election. If the last election brings individuals to Congress

whose local interests and preferences coincide with the president's, then he will enjoy greater success" (1990, 13).

[Insert Figure 1]

Figure 1 displays the number of the president's fellow partisans during each Senate from Presidents Eisenhower to Obama, with the Congresses during President Reagan's term highlighted. The first thing we see is the Democrats' general postwar dominance in congressional elections. In the upper chamber, (Democratic) presidents Johnson and Kennedy faced the most fellow-partisans while (Republican) Presidents Eisenhower and Ford faced the fewest. For President Reagan, the Senate's partisan balance is near the average overall, but better-than-average for Republican chief executives. The GOP controlled the majority of Senate seats during President Reagan's first 6 years (with 53, 55, and 53 seats) and the minority only in his last two (45 seats).

[Insert Figure 2]

Contrasted against the Senate, the House of Representatives presented President Reagan with a less agreeable lot. Figure 2 shows the number of presidential partisans in the House, with the four Congresses during President Reagan's term highlighted. As shown, President Reagan had smaller House minorities than any other president save for Eisenhower's final years and Ford's fleeting ones. This partisan breakdown would have posed an imposing coalition-building challenge anyway, but this was even more so here because House rules grant the majority's leaders considerable control over the chamber's agenda (see esp. Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005). From the White House Legislative Affairs staffers' perspective, then, it was the Democratic Speakers and House committee chairmen that posed the most formidable challenges to President Reagan and his legislative agenda.

Political Circumstances

As noted above, success on legislation requires support among lawmakers, which depends heavily on congressional composition. However, because the US system inhibits parties' ability to demand their members "toe the party line" (in campaigns or in governance), Congress' partisan composition and ideological predispositions do not predetermine a president's legislative fortunes. Even loyal legislative allies can (and will) vote against the president when his interests diverge from their own. This is why political setting also conditions a president's policymaking prospects.

The first important president-related political circumstance is also the best known: the "presidential honeymoon" – a period early in the president's first term where he enjoys uncommonly high support among the public (see Brace and Hinkley 1992; Brody 1991; Grossman and Kumar 1981) and their elected officials in Congress (see Beckmann and Godfrey 2007; Conley 2001; Grossback, Peterson, and Stimson 2005; Peterson et al. 2003). On the flip side, many assert that the end of a president's second term renders him something of a "lame duck," feckless if not altogether irrelevant (see Light 1997).

Between the (early) honeymoon and (late) farewell, the president's political capital ebbs and flows with the nation's economy and security (see Stimson 2004). A president operating before a backdrop of peace and prosperity will find lawmakers more pliable than a president dogged by recessions, wars, scandals, or some combination of each. Actually, shifting political circumstances explain why the president can be seen as hapless one year and effectual the next despite comparable policies, speeches, and staff. Such was the case for President Reagan, who witnessed a severe recession (and declining approval ratings) through his first two years, which quickly transformed into a robust economic recovery (and surging approval ratings) for the subsequent two years. The second term saw similar swings, from the lofty period following President Reagan's landslide reelection to the doldrums of the Iran Contra scandal.

Finally, the postwar period's increased polarization and increased partisanship have constrained each

president a little more than the one before. So although new and important laws continue to be enacted (see esp. Mayhew 2005; 2011), Frances Lee's new book convincingly shows when today's president's push legislation, it tends to polarize congressional partisans, thereby making it harder for the president to bridge the gap. Tellingly, she finds, "presidential leadership can spark intense partisan disagreement on issues that might otherwise have been uncontroversial or relatively uncontroversial," and that this reflexive opposition has been increasing (2009, 100).

Suffice it to say, the Constitution limits what presidents can command lawmakers do, and while congressional and political realities sometimes offer relief, often they do not. Still, that shepherding legislation is never easy does not mean presidents are unwilling to try.

President Reagan Beyond Context

Lyndon Johnson once joked, "Being President is like being a jackass in a hailstorm. There's nothing to do but stand there and take it." Of course, LBJ did not "just take" what Congress sent his way; to the contrary, he thrust himself into the legislative process – drafting, advocating, threatening, and negotiating. "There is but one way for a president to deal with Congress, and that is continuously, incessantly, and without interruption. If it is really going to work, the relationship has got to be almost incestuous," Johnson told Doris Kearns Goodwin (1991, 226).

[Table 1]

Though other postwar presidents have not thrown themselves into lawmaking as personally as Lyndon Johnson, nor have they sat on the legislative sideline. All postwar presidents have regularly endorsed preferred proposals and lobbied for their passage. Table 1 displays the extent of postwar presidents' involvement on a large sample of significant domestic legislation from 1953-2004 (see Beckmann 2010, Appendix). The most noteworthy result is that both Republicans and Democrats, in good times and bad, under unified and divided government, have pushed their agenda on Capitol Hill. In fact, presidents have been involved in roughly 3 in 4 of the day's most important

domestic legislative battles. And contrary to popular portrayals, President Reagan's administration was only somewhat more selective, advocating Reagan's position for 3 in 5 bills.

Assessing President Reagan's Legislative Touch

Considering presidents invest their time, energy, and reputation pushing preferred policies on Capitol Hill, the follow-up question is obvious: do these investments pay off? Furthermore, how did President Reagan's legislative record compare other postwar presidents? To answer these questions, let me now look at presidents' record on important domestic issues from 1953-2004. Figure 3 shows the proportion of bills resulting in a new law that moves policy toward the president's preferred position when the president "played no role" and when he "actively lobbied."

[Insert Figure 3]

Before examining the results, a preliminary point deserves mention: it is more instructive to look at presidents' relative levels of success (on bills lobbied versus bills ignored) than their absolute levels of success. The reason is that presidential influence does not entail overriding Congress and context altogether, but rather nudging it at the margins. So, for example, that President Carter has a far higher batting average than President Reagan does not mean he was more effective as a lobbyist (in fact, the evidence suggests the opposite is more likely). After all, Democrats dominated Congress for most of the postwar period, so the appropriate metric of presidents' impact requires looking at the *relative* impact of their lobbying efforts *given their context*.

A first and admittedly imperfect attempt on this path hints at why presidents expend so many resources pushing legislation: presidential lobbying has generally correlated positively with legislative success. On average, presidents' success has increased 30 percentage points when they lobbied compared to when they did not. This was true for Lyndon Johnson (+26) and George Bush (+46), Bill Clinton (+46) and Richard Nixon (+37). In fact, the only president whose lobbying correlated

with less success was Jimmy Carter (-17), the president often cited as exemplifying poor presidential coalition-building. Ronald Reagan's +37 lobbying yield puts him above average, albeit modestly so.

A Multiple Regression Test

As instructive as the descriptive results above may be, and although they partially account for the fact that different presidents work within different contexts, any inferences they suggest are necessarily tenuous. After all, the types of issues presidents ignore are different than the issues they lobby, so any differences we see between issues ignored and lobbied may say more about the issues than the presidents. Such would be the case if presidents were drawn to easier policy domains or issues that are especially salient. To account for these and comparable caveats, a multiple regression test is helpful. For not only does a properly-specified statistical model allow us to test presidents' impact on legislative success controlling for other, related variables, but it also allows us to identify the uncertainty such estimates entail. As such, let us briefly specify such a model and offer such a test.

As a reminder, the dependent variable here is rather simple: 1 if an initiative ended with a new law that changed federal policy in the president's preferred direction, 0 otherwise (meaning either no new law passed, or the one that passed moved policy away from the president's side). The most significant benefit of this measure is that it establishes an absolute standard of success, which facilitates our ability to make valid comparisons across presidents, Congresses, and contexts (see Beckmann 2010, Appendix for details).

Regarding presidents' ability to influence Congress, our crucial test comes on the "presidential involvement" variable discussed above, which runs from played no role (0) to endorsed a position (1) to actively lobbied (2). Isolating the relationship between presidential lobbying and legislative success, the also includes variables related to congressional composition (the ideological predisposition of the swing voter in the Senate and House, using NOMINATE scores (see Poole

and Rosenthal 1997)), political context (including a measure of the president's political standing, variables specifying the president's honeymoon and lame duck Congresses, a tenure variable accounting for president's increased experience dealing with Congress over their term, and a polarization measure based on the NOMINATE "distance" between the two parties in the Senate), and policy specifics (including a measure of the issue's salience, whether it was subject to a *CQ* key vote, as well as its general policy domain – civil rights, energy, healthcare, housing, taxes, or welfare). The results are detailed in Table 2.

[Insert Table 2]

The first and most important finding is the one many political scientists before have emphasized: congressional composition and political context matter – a lot. Comparing the friendly Congress Lyndon Johnson faced in 1965 to the unfriendly Congress Gerald Ford faced in 1975, the probability of presidential success when lobbying drops from 76% to 40% *holding all else equal*. So controlling for the nature of the issues they tackled, politics of the day, or particulars of the president, the White House's chances for success depended heavily on who happened to occupy the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue.

[Insert Figure 4]

Figure 4 illustrates the point more generally. It shows presidents' predicted success when pushing legislation given each Congress' ideological composition, holding all else equal. Affirming what the descriptive results hinted, these multiple regression results show presidents' win rate surges with the number of like-minded lawmakers. Thus Lyndon Johnson's domestic legislative accomplishments were due in no small part to the fact that he entered office with so many Democrats on Capitol Hill, while Gerald Ford's lack thereof was inevitable after his party's post-Watergate electoral losses. In fact, here again we see that the Democratic Party's disproportionate success in congressional elections between 1953 and 2004 was a great boon to Democratic

presidents' domestic legacies.

For Ronald Reagan, the opposition party's strength in the House greatly limited the Reagan administration's ability to pass preferred legislation, though the fact that many of those Democrats were ideological moderates certainly helped. Per the statistical model, President Reagan's best chances for passing legislation came in his first year (60%) before dipping (to 55% and ultimately to 50%) after Republicans lost seats over the next few elections. So the fact that President Reagan's legislative agenda experienced both historic success and frequent failures may seem incongruous at first blush, but upon further reflection, such is hardly a surprising pattern given the particular Congresses he faced.

While an agreeable Congress is the first and foremost predictor of presidents' legislative success, this is not to say presidents' fate is preset by congressional composition. Not only does the presidents' decision to push a bill greatly increase a bill's likelihood of passing, but the political context of the moment (a combination of economic growth and presidential approval) can boost its prospects further. To clarify these findings, let us use President Reagan's setting in 1981 as an illustrative case. Figure 5 shows the predicted changes of presidential success using the variable values in 1981 but varying the president's involvement and political context.

[Insert Figure 5]

Plainly, the notion that President Reagan's success on the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 defied political gravity is misguided, even if the scope of the win was somewhat surprising. After all, based on these 50+ years of data, we see that any president pushing such a salient legislative initiative would have had a good chance for signing a bill into law. Thus the ERTA is best understood as illustrating a broader phenomenon of presidential lobbying and legislative success.

Notice also the two more general points that emerge in Figure 5. First, the political environment

affects presidents' relationship with Congress, but more as a thumb on the scales rather than as a fundamental determinant of presidential success. Keeping all else constant, a president pushing his agenda under favorable circumstances (i.e., with a growing national economy and high approval ratings) will enjoy 18% more success than a president lobbying amidst political headwinds of slow economic growth and flagging poll numbers.

That leads us to our key finding: presidents' lobbying investments are a potent, reliable resource for influencing lawmakers and, in turn, legislation. Even controlling for congressional composition, political context, and policy particulars, a president's decision to make a "full court press" in support of a bill greatly increases its chances for becoming law (by over 30 percent). So even if President Ronald Reagan's efforts promoting the ERTA were not wholly unlike other presidents' lobbying campaigns, it is important to realize that ERTA likely would not have passed if President Reagan had not pushed it. For the basic lesson emerging from these results is this: presidents' decisions about where to invest their office's ample resources are integral to understanding contemporary lawmaking, particularly presidents' fortunes therein.

[Insert Figure 6]

For a final look at the model and its applicability to presidents' legislative records, Figure 6 compares the model's predictions of presidential success with each president's actual experiences. The results demonstrate the model performs well, corroborating the idea that opportunities for presidential success are tethered by factors presidents do not control (congressional composition, political context, and policy particulars), but even so, the presidency's lobbying arsenal allows its occupants to make a non-trivial difference at the margins.

All told, then, Ronald Reagan's legislative touch was real and substantial, but neither unrivaled nor unprecedented. His successes on the 1981 tax cut, Social Security amendments of 1983, tax reform in 1986, welfare reform in 1988 and beyond were indeed signature achievements –

ones that likely depended on President Reagan's support. The lesson, however, is not that President Reagan was one-of-a-kind, but rather that the presidency comes with a wellspring of institutional resources, which President Reagan used to good effect.

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Figure 1
The President's Number of Fellow Partisans in the US Senate, 1953-2012

Figure 2
The President's Number of Fellow Partisans in the House of Representatives, 1953-2012

Table 1
 Presidents' Involvement in Congressional Lawmaking, 1953-2004¹

	Avg. # Domestic Initiatives Per □ Congress During □ Each Administration	Among Issues Considered, Percent Where The President... <i>Actively Lobbied</i>		
Eisenhower	17	19 %	21 %	60 %
Kennedy	33	15 %	42 %	42 %
Johnson	30	13 %	28 %	58 %
Nixon	38	38 %	26 %	36 %
Ford	40	25 %	38 %	38 %
Carter	37	26 %	15 %	59 %
Reagan	38	42 %	18 %	40 %
Bush (41)	38	43 %	7 %	50 %
Clinton	24	39 %	15 %	45 %
Bush (43)	15	21 %	34 %	45 %
Mean (s.d.)	31 (9.3)	28 % (11.5)	24 % (11.4)	47 % (9.2)

Source: Beckmann (2010)

¹ Excludes Congresses where the presidency switched hands – i.e., the 88th (Kennedy to Johnson) and 93rd (Nixon to Ford). Also, data for President George W. Bush are limited to his first term.

Figure 3
Proportion of Bills Resulting in a New Law
Moving Toward the President's Position by his Level of Involvement

Table 2
Multiple Regression Test of Presidents' Legislative Success, 1953-2004¹

	Coef. (Robust SE) ²	z
President to House Median	-1.27 (.59)	-2.16**
President to Senate Pivot	-1.91 (.58)	-3.33**
White House Involvement	.45 (.07)	6.64**
Presidents' Political Capital	.23 (.06)	3.76**
Issue Salience	.03 (.01)	2.61**
Key Vote	-.29 (.16)	-1.80*
Honeymoon Period	.15 (.15)	.99
Lame Duck Period	-.26 (.25)	-1.01
President's Tenure	.16 (.09)	1.81*
Party Polarization (Senate)	-.10 (.66)	-.16
Constant	1.95 (.78)	2.50
N	769	
Log pseudolikelihood	-419.78	

** p < .05; * p < .10 (two-tailed)

Dependent Variable: bill resulting in a new law moving in the president's preferred direction (1) or not (0). The "not" category includes both bills that did not become law and ones that ended with a move the president opposed.

¹ The model also has fixed effects for each major issue (civil rights, education, etc.).

² Standard errors are adjusted for clustering by each issue subtopic.

Figure 4
Predicted Proportion of Issues Ending in a New Law Toward President's Position
When President Lobbied by each Congress's Ideological Composition (All Else Equal)

Figure 5

Prediction Proportion of Issues Ending in a New Law Toward President's Position
For the 97th Congress (1981-82), by Presidential Involvement and Political Context

Figure 6
Prediction and Actual Proportion of Issues Ending
in a New Law Toward President's Position, by President

Ways and Means Chairman, Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL), summarized swing lawmakers' choice: "Our bill, as the Speaker has pointed out, favors the working American families earning less than \$50,000. The Republican bill favors people making more than \$50,000. I'm afraid it's just that simple" (*New York Times* 7/28/1981).

More and more research now considers both "president-centered" and "presidency-centered" explanations of presidential actions and outcomes.

Though partisanship and ideology are related, mere binary partisan tallies obscure important intra-party differences. Numerous Democrats during the 1980s, for example, were so-called Boll Weevils (or Blue Dogs) – typically ideologically moderate-to-conservative Southerners whose constituents supported Ronald Reagan 1980 and 1984. Below I measure congressional composition in terms of its ideological rather than partisan distribution to capture these subtle but significant distinctions (see Poole and Rosenthal 1997; see also Brady and Volden 1998; Krehbiel 1998).

The Democratic House Speakers during Reagan's presidency were Tip O'Neill (D-MA) for the first six years, Jim Wright (D-TX) for the final two.

The study included 769 congressional initiatives receiving serious consideration between 1953 and 2004, including bills related to health (27%), education (17%), community and housing (16%), energy (15%), social welfare (13%), civil rights (9%), and taxes (3%).

The 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act is an example of a new law moving policy toward the president's preferred position. Specifically, the new law moved tax rates in a conservative direction, as President Reagan wanted.

Of course, Lyndon Johnson did somewhat better than expected, Jimmy Carter somewhat worse, but given uncertainty, we cannot say either's performance was significantly different than predicted.

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