# European Ancestry and Affirmative Action: The Long-term Effects of Whitening Policies in Southern Brazil *

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**Abstract**

Historically, countries have used migration to populate empty regions or supply labor to nascent economies. But what are the long-term political effects of these policies on inter-group redistribution? Empirically, I focus on the case of Brazil during the age of Mass Migration (1880-1930) to understand how diverse local migration policies explain the contemporary geography of support for redistribution and affirmative action. During that earlier age, Brazil offered land and labor to attract European migrants to work in the growing coffee sector in the country's South. Combining an original survey with archival and administrative data, I contend that places that gave land to migrants and people who descend from European migrants are less supportive of affirmative action policies for Blacks. The results also show that the proportion of winning White candidates in 2016 is larger in places with settlements. I argue that this effect results from the preservation and strengthening of racial and social hierarchies in Brazilian society that have been transmitted through generations.

**Keywords:** Migration, Affirmative action, Brazil, Migration policies, Historical Legacies

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# 1 Introduction

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a wave of state-sponsored migration policies swept across various parts of the world. Driven by a potent mix of racial ideologies, economic ambitions, and nation-building aspirations, these policies were often explicitly designed to "whiten" the population through schemes aimed at attracting European migrants. Offering incentives such as land grants, subsidies, and preferential access to resources, these initiatives left indelible marks on the political, economic, and social landscapes of the countries that implemented them (de Carvalho Filho and Monasterio 2012; Holloway 1980; Lesser 2013; Rocha et al. 2017; Skidmore 1990). Brazil, for instance, implemented subsidized immigration programs that brought millions of Europeans to work on coffee plantations and populate the country's vast interior. Similarly, other Latin American nations such as Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela also endeavored to attract European migrants. Comparable cases were observed in places like Australia, where infamous "White Australia" policies restricted non-European immigration until the 1970s, and in the United States, where initiatives like the Fisher-Miller Land Grant of 1842 facilitated German settlement in Texas. However, the political ramifications of these policies remain largely uncharted territory. Were they successful in perpetuating racialized differences across groups?

In this paper, I argue that land-settling migration policies, far from being mere historical events, are sources of persistent intergenerational inequality. By offering land grants (fixed assets) and economic incentives primarily to white European settlers, local political elites did more than populate territories; they were able to racialize spaces and perpetuate hierarchical structures within society. As a result, individuals born or socialized within these enclaves often develop a vested interest in maintaining these inherited advantages, especially opposing policies aimed at redistributing wealth or power across racial and ethnic lines, such as affirmative action initiatives.

To test this argument, I focus on the effects of these migration policies on populations rather than geographies, recognizing that the legacy of these policies is carried by individ-

uals themselves, not just in the physical spaces they once inhabited. To achieve this, I combine rich historical records with novel survey data that capture contemporary political attitudes. This unique dataset allows me to trace the legacies of these policies in explaining the contemporary geographical support for affirmative action. I conduct a series of fixed-effect regressions using two distinct measures of exposure to these migratory policies: first, a measure of European ancestry that captures the cultural imprint of these settlers on today's population, and second, a measure of distance from European settlements, capturing the spatial reach of their economic and social influence.

The state of São Paulo, Brazil, stands as a compelling case study for examining the relationship between historical migration patterns and contemporary social policies, particularly affirmative action initiatives. Renowned for its pivotal role in the global coffee trade, São Paulo witnessed waves of European migrants during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, drawn by opportunities in the burgeoning coffee industry. These migrants not only shaped the socio-economic landscape of the region but also contributed to the formation of Brazil's diverse cultural fabric. However, the historical legacy of migration to São Paulo also reveals the complexities of labor exploitation and racial hierarchies entrenched within the coffee plantations. Against this backdrop, the implementation of affirmative action policies in São Paulo and throughout Brazil emerges as a pivotal response to address historical injustices and systemic inequalities. Affirmative action measures, aimed at providing marginalized communities with access to education, employment, and political representation, are integral to the ongoing struggle for social justice and inclusivity in Brazilian society. By delving into São Paulo's rich historical heritage and contemporary social dynamics, this study seeks to illuminate the intricate interplay between migration, labor, and affirmative action in shaping the state's trajectory and advancing discussions on social equity and diversity.

Although the focus of this paper is on Brazil, settlement policies that affected race relations were common during periods of colonial expansion. For instance, during the early 1800s, British colonial rulers in Singapore created a policy that attracted Chinese migrants

who eventually became the largest ethnic group in the colony Osborne (2013, pg. 122). In the Americas, countries implemented settling policies to attract European migrants during the early 1900s, resulting in changes to the local composition of the population Sánchez-Alonso (2019) and the adoption of unequal policies whose consequences can still be seen today (Derenoncourt 2021; McNamee 2020; Nikolova 2017). These examples illustrate that settlement policies can affect the relative size and standing of different groups in society, leading to long-term consequences in political attitudes.

This paper's historical approach will be beneficial for understanding the consequences of pro-migration policies on political attitudes in developing countries. First, it highlights group salience in the analysis of the long-term effects of migration on political attitudes, complementing results from previous scholarship that emphasizes group size (Barone et al. 2016; Charnysh and Finkel 2017; Derenoncourt 2021; Dustmann et al. 2019; Halla et al. 2017; Mayda et al. 2021; Tabellini 2020). Second, given that attitudes towards immigration tend to be stable over time Kustov et al. (2021), analyzing the Brazilian case becomes key to explaining the critical junctures for political attitude formation. Third, the results will speak to the literature on preferences for redistribution along ethnic lines and its effects on public goods provision among ethnic groups (Alesina, Baqir, et al. 1999; Ejdemyr et al. 2018; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2016; Robinson 2016; Spater 2020). Lastly, given the rise in the number of migrants worldwide (IOM 2018) and the variation in pro-migration policies, understanding the Brazilian case from a historical perspective could inform current policies that are too recent to analyze or evaluate.

Much of the literature examining the historical roots of contemporary attitudes and behaviors primarily concentrates on coercive institutions, such as concentration camps (Chaudhary 2009; Homola et al. 2020; Voigtländer and Voth 2012), war-related events (Fouka and Voth 2022), or the presence of slavery (Acharya et al. 2018). Moreover, historical analyses often emphasize changes at the municipality level while neglecting internal migration movements (Marbach 2021) and their effects on populations themselves. By focusing on the

influence of European ancestry in Brazil, this paper examines the legacies of non-coercive institutions on contemporary attitudes towards outgroups and support for distributive policies from a population-centric perspective. In doing so, it aligns with recent research on the impact of formal and informal institutions on economic and political outcomes (Alvarez-Villa and Guardado 2020; Jha 2013), as well as recent historical analyses within the Brazilian context (Escamilla-Guerrero et al. 2024; Mangonnet 2020; Rocha et al. 2017). Additionally, this paper contributes to the literature on the institutional origins of racial attitudes (Acharya et al. 2016b; Jha 2013; Singh and Vom Hau 2016) by highlighting the effects of migrant ancestry and migration policies as institutional determinants of out-group differences.

This paper proceeds in eight sections. I begin by defining the main theoretical contributions of the paper. Next, I present the case study by describing the history of European migration to Brazil and the recent politicization of affirmative action. I then present the research design, explaining the main measures used and the types of comparisons I conduct. Afterward, I present the results on affirmative action, followed by those on the role of family socialization. Robustness checks are then conducted to ensure the reliability and validity of the findings. In addition, the paper examines other political effects of these policies, such as the racial demographics of winning candidates and attitudes towards race-blind measures of democracy. Finally, the paper concludes by summarizing key findings, reflecting on their implications, and suggesting avenues for future research.

# 2 How migration settlements and preference for inter-group redistribution

In this paper, I explain some of the legacies of migration settlement policies on current levels of support for affirmative action. In general terms, elites reproduce hierarchical structures by concentrating assets in their own co-ethnics and racializing space. This combination produces a good environment for the cultivation of attitudes against redistribution towards members

of the out-group. Affirmative action, as one of the policies affecting both redistribution and the ethnic social hierarchy, would be particularly opposed by members of these groups. These attitudes and preferences will be socialized through the families of their respective groups.

## 2.1 Increasing racial hierarchies through land settling policies

Settlement policies typically exhibit a significant in-group/out-group dimension, resulting in advantages and disadvantages across different groups, as they are designed to attract specific types of individuals. These distinctions can be delineated along various lines, including ethnicity, religion, and citizenship. To make the argument tractable, I will simplify the analysis by considering only three primary groups within the population: natives, migrants, and elites. Additionally, I will operate under the assumption that all migrants targeted by these policies are intended to be co-ethnics of the elites, reflecting their preferences in seeking to attract individuals from their own demographic group through settlement initiatives. While settlement policies may offer a range of incentives and can vary based on the initial endowments of the recipient municipality, I will focus specifically on policies granting access to land, which I will refer to as land-based settlement policies.

Land-based settlement policies provide each migrant family with access to a plot of land. Previous scholarship has found an association between land tenure with accelerated capital accumulation and increased access to governmental programs (Banerjee and Iyer 2005; Besley 1995; Lesser 2013; Mörner 1987). Access to land affords migrants the opportunity to accumulate assets and invest in entrepreneurial activities, leveraging land as collateral. One of the consequences of these benefits from land tenure is that assets become concentrated among people from the same ethnic group. Consequently, this disparity will exacerbate inter-group inequality within the places these policies are enacted and lay the groundwork for reinforcing stratified and hierarchical social systems(Lee 2020; Suryanarayan 2019).

Geographical space serves as another mechanism for reinforcing racial hierarchies. Elites

exert control over residency, thereby segregating ethnic groups, minimizing interaction between them, and enhancing inter-group inequality (Chaudhary 2009; Suryanarayan 2019). This spatial segregation racializes the landscape, limiting opportunities for diverse ethnic groups to interact and share public spaces. Consequently, the absence of contact and shared environments fosters negative attitudes towards other ethnicities and contributes to a less egalitarian social environment (Allport et al. 1954; Enos 2017).

Faster asset accumulation and a segregated landscape help reproduce social hierarchies in favor of the elites and their coethnics. Within these stratified societies, individuals are ascribed a social status that dictates their position in the societal hierarchy and their access to resources. Often, these ethnic classifications predate settlement policies and persist over time, exerting long-term effects on political attitudes, political agency (Lee 2020), and racial identification (McNamee 2020). In particular, I argue that these reinforced hierarchies will influence preferences regarding inter-group distribution dynamics.

In hierarchical societies, elites are strongly incentivized to maintain the system that ensures their dominance. This inclination can manifest in several ways. Firstly, elites may engage in state cooptation, manipulating institutions and reducing state capacity to withhold services from groups that could challenge their status dominance. For instance, historical evidence from colonial India demonstrates how local elites actively undermined state institutions to preserve their privileged position (Suryanarayan 2021). Secondly, elites often extend personalistic linkages to migrant coethnics, leveraging their resources to secure loyalty from newcomers. Lastly, elites resist efforts to reform the hierarchical structure, including opposition to distributional policies such as affirmative action that benefit non-coethnic natives. Research by Acharya et al. (2018) in the US highlights how this opposition extends beyond affirmative action to encompass voting preferences and antipathy towards Black citizens. It is important to distinguish this argument from the concept of racial threat, where elite attitudes stem from fear of large non-coethnic populations in their communities (Giles 1977; Key 1949).

With all these into consideration, I expect that:

- **H1:** Individuals living in migrant settlements or coming from a migrant family will have lower support for affirmative action measures intended for non-coethnics.

## 2.2 Persistence: Socialization and Factor Mobility

The persistence of attitudes over time has been a subject of significant debate and inquiry within political science. Previous scholarship has extensively examined how historical events continue to influence contemporary beliefs and behaviors, emphasizing the crucial role of historical context in understanding patterns of attitude persistence (Acharya et al. 2016b; Homola et al. 2020; Nunn and Wantchekon 2011; Voigtländer and Voth 2012). Moreover, certain strands of literature have explored how institutional persistence contributes to explaining behaviors across time (R. B. Collier, D. Collier, et al. 1991; Schwartz 2023; Thelen 1999). This paper contends that the persistence of hierarchical attitudes is largely facilitated through political socialization, whereby familial and social ties shape and perpetuate attitudes over time (Degner and Dalege 2013; Jennings 2007; Jennings and Markus 1984).

Just as Nazi camps in Germany (Charnysh 2019; Homola et al. 2020; Voigtländer and Voth 2012), the persistence of attitudinal effects stemming from migrant settlements is not solely attributed to the continuous existence of these institutions over time. Migrant colonial settlements typically cease to exist over time due to factors such as population growth, internal migration, and shifts in population composition. These migrant enclaves can grow a lot leading to the urbanization or rural spaces. Therefore, the enduring nature of attitudes this paper analyses cannot be solely ascribed to the static presence of co-ethnic settlements but must also account for the broader processes of socialization.

Factor mobility, particularly concerning land, plays a crucial role in perpetuating attitudes over space and time. As co-ethnic settlements expand and attract migrant populations, the access to land ownership and the influx of new settlers reproduce segregated spaces where racial hierarchies are reinforced. These attitudes tend to either stay with the people living

in these segregated geographies as a consequence of the low factor mobility of land assets or move with people who were born in these places as a process of socialization.

More formally, I expect that:

- **H2:** Descendants from people living in colonial settlements will tend to have similar attitudes to their parents.

# 3 Immigration and Affirmative Action in Brazil

## 3.1 Immigration, Coffee, and Race in the Brazilian Republic

During the late 1800s, Brazilian elites in Sao Paulo found themselves confronted with two factors that prompted them to seek alternative sources of labor. Firstly, the economic viability of relying on enslaved labor was diminishing as new legislation and international pressures made it easier for the enslaved population to secure their freedom[1]. Additionally, the costs of using enslaved labor increased due to escapes and uprisings, alongside changes in labor relations in the Brazilian coffee production areas (Da Costa 2006). Second, the burgeoning coffee plantations in eastern São Paulo were experiencing rapid growth, transforming into dynamic, export-oriented enterprises that would establish the state as the world's leading coffee production hub. Given these circumstances, introducing migrants into the state emerged as the most practical response for these agricultural elites.

Immigration in Sao Paulo was, for the most part, an elite-driven business. These planters, primarily engaged in coffee cultivation, initially shouldered the expenses of importing free labor to work on their plantations. Recognizing the potential benefits of immigration, some of these planters joined together to form the *Sociedade Promotora da Immigraç ao* (SPI). This private entity collaborated with the government to facilitate the influx of European labor into the country. Notably, the SPI continued its operations until 1892, when it was

[1]The process for abolition in Brazil was very long and complicated. In fact, Brazil was one of the last countries to abolish slavery in 1888. See Gomes (2022) and Skidmore (1990) for a more detailed account

integrated into the Secretary of Agriculture, streamlining the management of immigration efforts by the state. These institutional arrangements enabled centralized coordination of immigration initiatives and facilitated state subsidies for migrant transportation, a pivotal incentive that enabled individuals of modest means to seize opportunities in Brazil.[2] This phenomenon is illustrated in Figure C2 where most of the immigrants coming to Brazil did so under this subsidized regime.

Figure C4 presents the dynamics of tax revenue derived from coffee exports and the corresponding allocation of expenditures towards immigration programs spanning from 1892 to 1928. The data reveal that coffee exports constituted a substantial portion of government revenue, surpassing 40% of the total revenue throughout this three-decade period. This underscores the government's efforts at the time to ensure the welfare of coffee planters and think about ways to strengthen and enhance coffee production. Notably, a significant aspect of this strategy involved investment in European migration programs. Specifically, the graph illustrates that approximately 6.8% of the tax revenue was earmarked for immigrant programs, underscoring the government's prioritization of immigration initiatives within its budgetary allocations.

Migrants arrived in Brazil with the primary intention of working on coffee plantations, where they were usually granted access to a parcel of land and tasked with maintaining a specified number of coffee trees. Subsidies were provided exclusively to families with at least one working-age man, particularly favoring those with larger families, as they were deemed easier to handle, more productive, and less likely to abscond (Bassanezi 2021; Stolcke 1986). These families also utilized their allocated plots for subsistence farming. Those hired or recruited directly from Europe got a free week at the *Hospederia de Immigrantes* in Sao Paulo and the train tickets all the way to the plantation or European settlement (*Núcleos*

[2]Subsidization of migrant travel emerged as a critical incentive for migration to Brazil, particularly noteworthy given that migrants to Brazil were often from less affluent backgrounds compared to those heading to Argentina (Hutter 2017). Notably, migrants to Argentina typically possessed the financial means to purchase their own tickets, resulting in a demographic skew towards single businessmen and traders rather than agricultural families. Moreover, Brazil also had a more challenging time competing with more Austral countries, given it was labeled as a tropical destination filled with tropical diseases (Hutter 2017)

*Coloniais*) they were allocated to (Bassanezi 2021). Moreover, those migrating alone were often permitted to bring their families at a later stage. It was not uncommon for plantations and settlements to establish their educational facilities to cater to the needs of the resident families.

European settlements represented a significant institutional innovation and a central component of migratory policy in São Paulo. For the coffee elite (*fazendeiros*), these settlements offered a more secure contractual arrangement with migrants, facilitating better care for coffee trees, appreciating land values, and enabling the continuous expansion of the coffee frontier (Stolcke 1986; Tessari 2014). Furthermore, the expansion of coffee cultivation, coupled with state investments in the railway system, led to reduced transportation costs. From the perspective of migrants, settlements provided a more dependable source of income, ensuring a consistent and fixed stream of revenue dependent on cultivated area rather than anticipated yields (Stolcke 1986). Additionally, in some instances, settlements facilitated the establishment of educational and religious amenities by migrants. A comprehensive listing of the number and names of European settlements in São Paulo is detailed in Table B13. Moreover, Figure 1 illustrates the municipalities that, at some stage, hosted European settlements.

Historical records document instances of migrant mistreatment on coffee plantations. The mistreatment was severe enough to prompt some European countries to impose bans on migration promoters and cease business dealings with migration companies (Hutter 2017). For instance, Italy implemented a decree in 1902, leading not only to a decline in overall immigration but also a decrease in the proportion of Italian migrants among those immigrating to Brazil, as depicted in Figure C3. Consequently, migration companies and the state of Sao Paulo exerted considerable efforts to address these issues and maintain a steady influx of labor. This endeavor was further fueled by the realization that immigrants had limited access to markets beyond their land plots or the plantations where they were employed. Consequently, many immigrants found themselves heavily indebted to plantation




**Note:** The map presents the municipalities that held a European Settlement between 1898 and 1912. The map was elaborated with contemporary municipal boundaries.

Figure 1: Municipalities with a Colonial Settlement

owners (Bassanezi 2021).

Land acquisition played a pivotal role in attracting migrants, a fact exemplified not only by the successful German migration to the State of Santa Catarina in the early 1800s (Lesser 2013) but also by its prominent feature in promotional materials distributed in Europe (**brochure1886**; Holloway 1980). Buying land was relatively affordable for migrants as it required around 4 to 5 years of savings, sometimes less, for an average family.[3] This resulted in an increased number of migrant landowners over time.[4] Data extracted from the 1904-1905 agricultural census revealed that migrants owned on average 28% of properties in the state of Sao Paulo. Subsequent census records indicated a rise in this figure, attributable primarily to the accessibility of new land resulting from the westward expansion of the coffee

[3]According to statistics presented by Holloway (1980) an average family of four would have annual net income between 200 and 582 reis. According to the **brochure1886** property had a value of 500 reais.

[4]However, it is important to mention that given the large number of migrants, this was overall a small proportion (Bassanezi 2021)

frontier within the state.

Migrants were not only brought to Brazil as labor; these policies also intended to "Whiten" the population. This is why there was a strong preference for white migrants and often bans for non-white migrants that eventually were uplifted when the access to European migration decreased (Nobles 2000). Brazilian elites were keen and invested in preserving a racial hierarchy and viewed this as a means to foster societal advancement (Nobles 2000; Skidmore 1990; Weinstein 2015). However, in their efforts to maintain this hierarchy, an ideology of *"racial democracy"* emerged, promoting the notion that Brazilian society was neither enhanced nor stratified by race (Freyre 2019; Guimarães 2006; Nobles 2000; Weinstein 2015). This ideology, often critiqued as a strategy to undermine Brazil's black movement, was built upon the myth of social ascension through miscegenation, primarily of mulattoes and *pardos*[5] (Bernardino 2002; Sales Jr 2006). This myth has even contributed to a phenomenon where individuals in European settlements tend to identify less often as *pretos* and more as white (McNamee 2020). Language related to the preferences for European ancestry can still be found in government migration decrees all the way to 1945, indicating a long-lasting preference for whitening policies (Brazilian Government 1945).

It is important to note that, during the age of mass migration, European migrants arriving in São Paulo did not pose significant economic competition to local elites for several reasons. Firstly, migrants typically filled lower-skilled and manual labor positions in the state's burgeoning industrial and agricultural sectors, while local elites held sway over higher-level economic activities such as large-scale enterprises and landownership. This division in labor roles contributed to a segmented labor market where migrants occupied positions that did not directly challenge elite economic dominance. Moreover, social and ethnic barriers existed between migrants and the elite class, limiting migrants' access to networks and resources critical for competing in higher echelons of the economy (Lesser 2013). Additionally, local elites wielded considerable political influence, shaping policies and regulations to their

[5]In the Brazilian case, *pardos* are mixed race individuals who don't identify themselves as black

advantage and maintaining their economic supremacy.

## 3.2 What about affirmative action?

In Brazil, although not legally enforced as in other countries, the country's racial hierarchy has been effectively maintained through informal social mechanisms such as the myth of *Racial Democracy* (Marx 1998; Silva 2016; Silva and Saldivar 2018). While discrimination in Brazil often intersects with class, the historical association of whiteness with wealth and blackness with poverty has solidified a racial aesthetic captured in the phrase "money whitens." (Htun 2004; Silva 2016) As a result, being black has been linked with lower socioeconomic status, limited opportunities, menial labor, and living in marginalized communities.

In 2001, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso made a significant shift from Brazil's traditional colorblind approach by publicly endorsing affirmative action measures. This move positioned Brazil as one of the pioneering countries in Latin America to implement widespread affirmative action policies (Moraes Silva, Daflon, et al. 2024). These policies are typically designed to grant preferential access to education, political institutions, and employment opportunities in both the private and public sectors for individuals belonging to traditionally marginalized groups (Jensenius 2017; Lee 2021). Although federal legislation formalizing affirmative action was enacted in 2012, many universities had already introduced some form of racial quotas or bonuses for higher education since the 2000s, with some institutions implementing these measures as early as the 1990s (De Micheli 2018; Htun 2004; Moraes Silva and Paixão 2023). This shift was propelled by a growing wave of social mobilization on racial issues throughout the 1990s, marked by increased participation of black organizations in the political arena (Bernardino 2002).[6]

The implementation of affirmative action, particularly in the form of quotas, received widespread support from high-ranking officials, including President Cardoso. The president of the Supreme Constitutional Court publicly endorsed race quotas, acknowledging the un-

[6]For a complete account of the process of affirmative action in Brazil see Htun (2004)

deniable racial inequalities in Brazil and advocating for legal intervention to address such disparities. According to Moraes Silva and Paixão (2023), the number of spots reserved for black students in federal universities increased from 8.7% in 2012 to 23.5% 23.5%. Similarly, between 2012 and 2015, the number enrolled Black, *Pardo*, and Indigenous students in federal universities increased by 7%. This policy shift has been instrumental and has even led some individuals to reclassify themselves as Black, underscoring its transformative impact (De Micheli 2018; Francis and Tannuri-Pianto 2013). Furthermore, it has effectively increased the proportion of black students in Federal universities (Francis-Tan and Tannuri-Pianto 2018; Mello 2022). Presently, Brazil has quotas for blacks, Indigenous, and students with disabilities for access to higher education, as well as quotas for Blacks to work as civil servants.

Recent studies have highlighted a notable decline in support for affirmative action measures. Data from LAPOP's 2010 Brazilian survey (depicted in Figure C5) indicate that support for these policies varies significantly based on the respondent's race and region of residence. White Brazilians, particularly those in the southern regions, are more inclined to oppose affirmative action policies in education. This pattern is also evident among Black and *Pardo* individuals, which is somewhat puzzling, considering that these policies are designed to address and correct historical marginalization that has favored these groups. This may be partly due to some white individuals strategically using self-classification into racial minorities' criteria to gain access to these policies(Neves 2022). As a result, in 2018, Brazil made it mandatory to establish verification commissions to assess access to affirmative action policies in the public service, which resulted in race being viewed as a phenotype and race being decontextualized (Moraes Silva, Daflon, et al. 2024). This could also be attributed to a social desirability bias among students who may prefer not to publicly support these types of policies (Turgeon et al. 2014).

Most of the arguments opposing affirmative action tend to be explained by a version of color-blinded racism (Bonilla-Silva 2021). This becomes prevalent when looking at some

responses to an open-ended question included on my survey where black, *Pardo*, and white respondents mention that affirmative action is either unfair against whites with similar levels of ability or a way of reinforcing racial differences. For instance, a respondent wrote that "universities shouldn't give scholarships to black people; this sounds more like racism, as if black people weren't capable of achieving their capabilities." Similarly, another responded wrote: "I'm against quotas because I think everyone's brains are equal [...], quotas for the poor, yes, now for race, no, because we have different colors we must fight to prove that we are equal and we don't need handouts".

# 4 Research design

## 4.1 Data Sources and Sample

**Explanatory Variables** For this study, I collected data from three different sources to understand how historical migration policies can explain the contemporary geography of support for affirmative action. Firstly, I analyzed population records between 1898 and 1912 from Sao Paulo's *Annuários Estatísticos* to identify colonial settlements at the time. I then cross-referenced this data with historical accounts and scholarly works to compile a comprehensive list of these settlements (Bassanezi 2021; Holloway 1978; Rocha et al. 2017; Stolcke 1986). Secondly, I examined archival materials from the 1872 Population Census and the 1904 Agricultural Census preserved by the *Núcleo de Estudos de Populaç ao Elza Berquó* (NEPO). Finally, I conducted a survey in the summer of 2023 across the state of Sao Paulo, which historically received a substantial influx of European immigrants during the Age of Mass Migration[7].

**Public Opinion Data** The survey uses a convenience sample reflective of the demo-

[7]The survey also has an additional sample of 600 respondents that was drawn from coffee-growing municipalities in Minas Gerais, a state that experienced comparatively lower levels of immigration during the same period. This inclusion provides comparative insights regarding the influence of historical migration patterns on the survey outcomes within distinct contexts

graphic composition of Sao Paulo. Strata were delineated based on gender, age, and residency status within the city of Sao Paulo, mirroring the latest census demographics (2022). The survey contains nine modules as illustrated in Figure A1 that collect information about family history as well as questions to measure racial preferences. I also added two modules on preferences for redistribution and migration whose order was randomized to the participants given the findings from Alesina, Miano, et al. (2023) where questions about immigration can make respondents less favorable towards redistribution.

The survey was distributed through Netquest's online panel. For those who finished the entire survey, a compensation of $1.11 USD was given to participants for use in Netquest's exchange platform. Partial compensation was given to those expelled from the survey because they failed at least one of the attention checks. Further survey details can be found in Appendix A

Furthermore, the table indicates that 69% of respondents self-identified as white, while 28% identified themselves as either Black or *Pardo*. Additionally, approximately half of the sample reported having some European ancestry, while 4% indicated having Asian ancestry. Notably, the data reveals that, on average, respondents possessed at least one migrant ancestor within their parents' and grandparents' generations. I also find that 15% of the sample supports the idea of a *racial democracy* in Brazil.

The data illustrates that the sample respondents tend to overwhelmingly (74%) support affirmative action policies directed toward poor Brazilians. This number drops to 53 for the case of affirmative action policies toward Indigenous peoples and to 52% for the case of policies directed to Black students. Finally, the data shows that support is the lowest for affirmative action policies granting preferential access to Blacks into the public service.

## 4.2 Measuring and Analyzing Migrant Ancestry and Affirmative Action in Brazil

In the explanations of the effect of local historical events or institutional changes in contemporary political behaviors, scholars often rely on the comparison between individuals who live in historically exposed and unexposed areas (Fouka and Voth 2022; Homola et al. 2020; Mazumder 2018; Rozenas and Zhukov 2019). However, this comparison usually ignores the fact that people can move across boundaries between the time of the "treatment" and the measurement of its effect. In particular, there can be a mixture of people at differing levels of exposure living both in historically treated and untreated areas (Marbach 2021). This muddles the causality of these persistence effects as it becomes harder to understand what the groups being compared. In this sense, an inclusion of post-treatment sorting in the analysis (Marbach 2021) or being able to run a series of linked multigenerational surveys (Lupu and Peisakhin 2017) could help account for

To capture the effects of settling migratory policies in Sao Paulo under Marbach (2021) framework, I would need to compare individuals who lived within European settlements with those who did not. However, the data I collected constrains me from making this comparison as there is no information on the places respondents were born or an oversample of individuals who were alive when these policies were in place. Consequently, I adopt three strategies to address this constraint.

Firstly, I employ two distinct approaches to operationalize exposure to historical migration policies. On one hand, I leverage questions from the survey concerning respondents' migrant ancestry. Specifically, I ask whether respondents' parents, grandparents, or great-grandparents originated from Europe, and construct an indicator variable assigned a value of 1 equal to 1 if the respondent answered yes to any of those questions. While this method does not discern direct descendants of migrants who resided in European settlements, it identifies individuals with an European ancestry, who are more likely to have been related to people exposed to these policies. I assume here that individuals emphasizing European ancestry

are inclined to identify more strongly with white cultural norms, potentially perpetuating racialized hierarchical structures.

Additionally, drawing on the legacy studies literature (Charnysh and Finkel 2017; Homola et al. 2020), I devise a distance metric between respondents and the nearest municipality with a colonial settlement. This measure is computed as the minimum geodesic distance between the respondents to the center of the nearest colonial settlement. These municipalities can be seen in Figure 1 using QGIS[8]. Notably, this proxy does not consider the historical or current transportation infrastructure. Nevertheless, it offers an advantage by capturing the proximity to colonial settlements while remaining uncorrelated with contemporary public opinion determinants (Charnysh and Finkel 2017; Homola et al. 2020). Then, I use a regression model with historical region fixed effects with robust standard errors to see if differences in exposure, proxied by these two measures, explain support for affirmative action policies. Given the changes in the municipal structure of Sao Paulo state, I use a for the fixed effects a series of geographical regions determined by the historical demographer of the *Núcleo de Estudos de Populaç ao Elza Berquó* (NEPO) at UNICAMP.

The second strategy revolves around making detailed comparisons that allow me to disentangle the effects of the migration policies. First, I keep migrant ancestry constant and vary access to these policies proxied by the Brazilian state where respondents live. I also restrict the sample to only migrants in Sao Paulo, to keep policies constant, and look at changes in people's ancestry. Furthermore, I conduct comparisons between individuals with and without European ancestry residing in municipalities characterized by either the highest concentration of European migrant landholdings or the largest proportion of municipal territory owned by migrants, as documented in the 1904-1905 agricultural census.

Thirdly, to address potential post-treatment bias, I adopt the approach proposed by Acharya et al. (2016a) and implement a sequential g-estimation procedure on the primary findings. Specifically, I compute the average total causal direct effect (ACDE) for both

[8]Using the center of the municipality helps decrease problems with changing boundaries over time

the distance and ancestry measures. In this procedure, I incorporate income and self-identification as white as additional variables. These variables are included due to their demonstrated susceptibility to the effects of settlement policies and their known influence on support for affirmative action (Acharya et al. 2018; McNamee 2020).

**Outcome variables** The primary outcome variable of this paper measures individual preferences over affirmative action. During the survey, respondents were asked to express their agreement or disagreement with affirmative action programs that reserve spots in public universities for Black individuals. I then created an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent said they agreed with such programs and zero otherwise.

Drawing on the PERLA questionnaire framework (Telles 2014), respondents were also queried about their perspectives on affirmative action initiatives for indigenous peoples, economically disadvantaged individuals, and the reservation of positions in Brazilian public service for Black individuals. This approach facilitates an examination of variations not only across distinct ethnic cohorts but also across access to disparate spheres, such as education versus government employment. Additionally, the analysis incorporates a measure of support for *racial democracy*, a prominent concept in Brazilian political discourse positing the absence of racial distinctions in the country.

Finally, to measure socialization, I use three distinct measures. Firstly, respondents were asked whether they voted in the same manner as either their father or mother during the first round of the 2022 presidential elections. For those who did, an indicator variable was constructed and assigned a value of one; otherwise, it received a value of zero. Additionally, respondents were queried about their engagement in political discussions within their families during their formative years, recognized as a key form of political socialization in the scholarly literature (Jennings 2007).

# 5 Colonial Settlements and Support for Affirmative Action

Table 1 shows the results of three fixed-effects models analyzing the effects of exposure to migration policies and support for affirmative action. All models include as controls respondents' gender, age, employment status, marital status, and educational attainment. To mitigate potential biases stemming from the interrelation between migrant descent, race, and income, these variables were omitted in these analyses. The full set of results, including those with and without controls, can be found in Table B4. The measure for affirmative action has been standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one for ease of interpretation.

In the first column of the table, I report the results for the effect of European ancestry on support for affirmative action. As expected, those individuals who had European ancestry were 9.6% standard deviations less likely to support affirmative action policies for Blacks in higher education. Also, as expected those individuals who live further away from a colonial settlement have a lower support for affirmative action policies as shown in column 2 of the table. Notably, moving 100 Km away from a European settlement is correlated with an increase of 0.7% standard deviations. While statistically significant, both findings demonstrated modest effect sizes but are robust across various model specifications.

Model 3 presents estimates from an interaction model exploring the interplay between ancestry and distance. On one hand, we might expect individuals with European ancestry living near European settlements to have stronger attitudes against affirmative action. If this were the case, we would expect the interaction coefficient to be statistically significant. Conversely, if hierarchical attitudes are transmitted through intergenerational socialization patterns, individuals with European ancestry residing farther from settlements might exhibit attitudes comparable to those living in closer proximity, as these attitudes "run in the family." In this scenario, the coefficient for the interaction term should approximate

Table 1: Support for Affirmative Action

| | *Dependent variable:* | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Support for Affirmative Action for Blacks in Higher Ed | | |
| | European Ancestry | Distance | Interaction |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| European Ancestry | -0.096* | | -0.102* |
| | (0.057) | | (0.058) |
| Distance to NC | | 0.007*** | 0.008** |
| | | (0.002) | (0.004) |
| Distance X Ancestry | | | -0.001 |
| | | | (0.005) |
| Controls | YES | YES | YES |
| NEPO FE | YES | YES | YES |
| Num. Obs | 1360 | 1359 | 1359 |
| R Squared | 0.155 | 0.092 | 0.093 |
| *Note:* | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 | |

**Notes**: The table illustrates the OLS coefficients for regression controlling for respondent's gender, age, employment status, if the individual is married and if the individual has a high school degree. The models also include fixed effects for the historical region they live in. These regions are defined using historical Paulista regions according to the *Núcleo de Estudos de Populaç ao Elza Berquó*. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.

zero. The empirical results in Table 1 corroborate the latter expectation, as the interaction term is statistically insignificant at conventional levels and thus indistinguishable from zero. Furthermore, the results show that the measures of distance and ancestry continue to be statistically significant and maintain the hypothesized direction.

The previous results shed some light on how exposure to migratory policies harms contemporary support for affirmative action. However, estimates in Table C5 only present differences between individuals with migrant ancestry and the general population. It is plausible that these results may not fully capture the legacy effects of migratory policies, as both ancestry and policies are simultaneously subject to variation within Sao Paulo. Despite

the limited number of European settlements, it is important to acknowledge the extensive scope of migratory policies implemented in São Paulo during the age of Mass Migration. To account for this, I make a series of group comparisons available within the dataset by changing the sample where the estimates are calculated to further identify the variation created by the migratory policies in Sao Paulo[9].

The results of these additional comparisons are displayed in Table 2. Initially, I restricted the sample to individuals with European ancestry residing in the states of São Paulo and Minas Gerais. Minas Gerais serves as a good control to São Paulo due to two main factors. Firstly, its geographical conditions are conducive to large-scale coffee production, akin to São Paulo. In fact, by 2024, Minas Gerais had long overtaken São Paulo as Brazil's foremost coffee-producing state. Secondly, unlike São Paulo, Minas Gerais lacked the resources and incentives to actively encourage European migration to its territory during the late 19th century, resulting in minimal support for migratory policies. Furthermore, it's notable that some descendants of European migrants in Minas Gerais initially settled in São Paulo or Rio de Janeiro before migrating inward. By contrasting respondents with European ancestry in these states, we can hold ancestry constant while introducing variation in access to migratory policies. Column 1 in Table 2 presents the estimates for this comparison, with the full set of results, including estimates for the controls, available in Table B4. The findings indicate that European descendants living in the state of Sao Paulo are 15% standard deviations less likely to support affirmative action policies. This suggests that exposure to settlement policies, rather than ancestry itself, drives the results observed in Table 1, aligning with Hypothesis 1.

[9]All these comparisons rely solely on the ancestry measure for two main reasons. Firstly, in the case of the additional sample from Minas Gerais, it is impractical to calculate the distance measure to colonial settlements since the state did not have any state-promoted European settlements. Consequently, using the distance to colonial settlements in São Paulo would introduce bias into the estimates, as individuals in Minas Gerais would, on average, reside farther away from these settlements. Second, for those comparisons focusing on a smaller group of municipalities, we are already focusing on a specific subset of locations with similar attributes. Adding a distance measure may introduce unnecessary complexity and redundancy, as the variation in distances between these municipalities may not be substantial or relevant to the research question.

Table 2: Other comparisons for the effect

| Dependent Variable: | Normalized Support for Affirmative Action for Blacks in Higher Education | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Just Respondents with European Ancestry (1) | Migrant Intensity (2) | All Paulista Migrants (3) | Top Landholdings (1904) (4) | Top Area (1904) (5) |
| Lives in Sao Paulo | -0.1515** | | | | |
| | (0.0717) | | | | |
| Number of Migrant Ancestors | | -0.0547*** | | | |
| | | (0.0127) | | | |
| European Ancestry | | | 0.1352 | -0.1123*** | -0.0575 |
| | | | (0.1452) | (0.0266) | (0.0622) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| NEPO Regions FE | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Municipality FE | Yes | No | No | No | No |
| Observations | 874 | 1,360 | 745 | 847 | 740 |
| $R^2$ | 0.12088 | 0.15880 | 0.21263 | 0.14618 | 0.17000 |

*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

**Notes**: The table illustrates the OLS coefficients for regression controlling for respondent's gender, age, employment status, if the individual is married, and if the individual has a high school degree. The models also include fixed effects for the historical region they live in. These regions are defined using historical Paulista regions defined by the *Núcleo de Estudos de Populaç ao Elza Berquó.* Standard errors were clustered at the NEPO level.

Column two in Table 2 shows an intensive margin analysis of the main results. In this respect, it presents the estimates for the fixed effects model using a continuous variable for ancestry based on the number of migrant parents and grandparents of the respondents. The results also align with Hypothesis 1, in that an additional migrant ancestor decreases support for affirmative action by 5% of a standard deviation. Furthermore, on column 3 I constrain the sample to only individuals of European ancestry living within Sao Paulo. This subset enables me to isalate exposure to migratory policies while varying ancestry among migrant descendants. Sao Paulo not only attracted European migrants but also individuals from Asia, Africa, and other parts of the Americas. Descendants from these diverse groups serve as the counterfactual for the model in Column 3. The findings indicate that among respondents with any form of international migrant ancestry, there are no statistically significant differences between those whose families originated from Europe and those from other regions. This suggests that for migrant descendants, there are no discernible distinctions across various

types of ancestries [10].

In this paper, I argue that migrant access to land when coming to Brazil generated initial asset differences that helped reproduce racialized hierarchical structures in the minds of these newcomers. If this is true, we should expect stronger effects in those areas where migrants held a large number of landholdings. To test this, I use the Sao Paulo Agricultural Census of 1904-1905 which contains information on the proportion of migrant landholdings and the total area held by migrants by municipality. On columns 4 and 5 in Table 2, I restrict the sample to municipalities characterized by either a significant proportion of European landholders or a substantial share of the total area owned by European migrants i 1905[11]. The results show that respondents with European ancestry living in places where the number of migrant landowners was high in 1905 support 11.2% standard deviation less affirmative action policies when compared to individuals with no European decent. The results also indicate that the effects are only related to the proportion of European landowners and not with the percentage of the area they hold.

Overall, these results evidence that there is a robust correlation between exposure to migration settlement policies and decreases support for affirmative action measures. Further comparisons across states and municipalities with varying migratory policies confirm the influence of exposure to settlement policies on contemporary support for affirmative action. In particular, individuals with European ancestry in São Paulo are less likely than their Minas Gerais' counterparts to support such policies, suggesting that exposure to settlement policies rather than ancestry itself drives these attitudes. Intensive margin analysis confirms these patterns, with additional migrant ancestors associated with decreased support for affirmative action. Moreover, comparisons based on historical data on migrant landholdings reveal stronger effects in municipalities with a high proportion of European landowners in

[10]In fact, some initial results show that Brazilian wit Asian descent have lower levels of support for affirmative action

[11]An area was considered large if it had a proportion larger than the mean proportion of all municipalities. This means municipalities where European migrants held more than 28,3% of all properties or where European migrants owned more than 25.5% of all the municipality's arable areas.

1905, underscoring the enduring influence of historical migration policies on contemporary attitudes.

## 5.1 Accounting for Post-treatment bias with observed variables

Considering the persistence of historical events, there exists a potential for post-treatment bias in the previous regression analysis. This bias stems from the fact that the concentration of European descendants directly results from migratory policies and the promotion of European settlements during the Age of Mass Migration in Brazil. Furthermore, the inclusion of contemporary measures of variables affected by these historical factors may violate the assumption of no intermediate confounders (Imai et al. 2011), potentially leading to post-treatment bias. To address this concern, I reestimate the findings presented in Table 1 utilizing a sequential g-estimation technique (Acharya et al. 2016a) to estimate the average controlled direct effect (ACDE) of migrant past in the contemporaneous geography of support for affirmative action.

Sequential g-estimation is a technique that calculates the controlled direct effect (CDE) of a treatment. Which is the direct effect of a treatment when a mediator is fixed on a given value for all units. This process initially determines the effects of intermediate variables on the outcome variable, followed by removing the calculated effect of the intermediate variable from the outcome. Subsequently, it calculates the effect of treatment on this *demediated* outcome to gather the CDE. The estimate of interest is the Average Controlled Direct Effect (ACDE) which is obtained by averaging the individual CDEs from the observations in the sample. A non-zero ACDE implies that the effect of treatment is not due **exclusively** to the mediator being analyzed (Acharya et al. 2016a).

Table 3 presents a comparison between the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) from Table 1 and the ACDE derived using the g-estimation technique. In both instances, I employ non-parametric bootstrapped errors to calculate the 95% confidence intervals. The ACDE is computed by including the individual's income bracket and their response to the question of

Table 3: Estimates of the ATE and the ACDE of Migrant Settlements on the support for affirmative action

| | European Ancestry | Distance |
|---|---|---|
| ATE | -0.048 | 0.004 |
| | [-0.104,0.008] | [0.001,0.006] |
| ACDE | -0.046 | 0.004 |
| | [-0.096,-0.047] | [0.002,0.004] |

**Notes**: For the ACDE, the mediator is income bracket in 2023. Nonparametric bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals based on 1,000 resamples shown in brackets.

White self-identification, as these variables may be outcomes of colonial settlements and are correlated with affirmative action support. The ACDE is calculated with the income variable fixed at the mean. The results mirror those of Table 1, indicating that individuals with European ancestry exhibit lower support for affirmative action, while those residing farther from areas with European settlements demonstrate higher levels of support for affirmative action.

## 5.2 Other Measures of Affirmative Action

The results thus far confirm a negative correlation between exposure to migrant policies and support for affirmative action policies for the access of Black individuals into higher education. However, it remains unclear whether these results reflect a general opposition to affirmative action policies or specifically to initiatives promoting access for Black individuals. To address this question, I extend the analysis to other forms of affirmative action policies prevalent in Brazil. Specifically, I examine preferential access to higher education for Indigenous and low-income groups, as well as preferential access to the Brazilian civil service for Black people. By investigating these additional policies, I aim to understand whether exposure to whitening policies, as measured by ancestry and distance, is associated with opposition to policies targeting Black individuals. Alternatively, if exposure is linked to a broader opposition to all forms of redistribution, then negative effects would be expected across all policy types irrespective of their targetted group.

Graph 2 and Table B6 display the results from these analyses. Results show that in terms of distance, individuals living farther away from European settlements tend to support affirmative action policies more irrespective of the targeted group. However, when looking at the results of ancestry, I find that only the estimate for access to Black into public service is negative and statistically significant (Figure 2c). These outcomes suggest that among those of European ancestry, backing for such measures diminishes primarily when they are targeted at the Black population.

# 6 Persistence via Socialization

So far, the findings reveal that individuals with European ancestry and those residing in closer proximity to European settlements tend to exhibit lower levels of support for affirmative action policies. However, an important question remains: How do attitudes forged during the Age of Mass Migration help explain contemporary patterns of geographic support for affirmative action? In this paper, I argue that the persistence of hierarchical attitudes is largely driven by political socialization, particularly through familial and social networks (Degner and Dalege 2013; Jennings 2007; Jennings and Markus 1984; Lindgren and Oskarsson 2023).

Table 4 showcases the results of fixed-effects regression models to examine the connection between various indicators of familial socialization and European ancestry. These models employ municipal-level fixed effects, although NEPO fixed effects yield similar outcomes.

In Column (1), the results indicate that individuals with European ancestry are 10 percentage points more likely to vote the same way as their fathers in Brazil's 2022 presidential elections. Similarly, the likelihood of voting for the same candidate as their mothers is 7.9 percentage points higher among individuals with European ancestry[12]. As noted by Lindgren and Oskarsson (2023), these intergenerational estimates may underestimate the true

[12]Note that the observations for these models are restricted to individuals who reported voting in Brazil's 2022 first round of presidential elections

(a) Support for Affirmative Action for access to higher education to Indigenous individuals




(b) Support for Affirmative Action for access to higher education to poor individuals




(c) Support for Affirmative Action for access to Public Service to Black individuals




**Note:** The figures illustrates the OLS coefficients for regression controlling for respondent's gender, age, employment status, if the individual is married and if the individual has a high school degree. The models also include fixed effects for the historical region they live in. These regions are defined using historical Paulista regions according to the *Núcleo de Estudos de Populaç ao Elza Berquó*. The lines represent robust standard errors at the 95% level.

Figure 2: Estimates of European Ancestry and Distance on various measures of Affirmative Action

effects of socialization, suggesting potentially larger effects among families with European ancestry. Additionally, Column (3) reveals that individuals with European ancestry are more inclined to engage in political discussions within their households, with a 14.7 percentage point increase in the likelihood of discussing political matters compared to the general population.

Table 4: Persistence through Socialization

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Vote Same - Dad | Vote Same - Mom | Grew up discussing politics | Hierarchichal Index |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| European Ancestry | 0.105** | 0.079** | 0.147*** | 0.248*** |
| | (0.043) | (0.039) | (0.032) | (0.068) |
| Female | -0.089** | -0.081** | -0.059** | 0.053 |
| | (0.039) | (0.036) | (0.029) | (0.061) |
| Age | 0.005*** | 0.004*** | -0.002 | -0.004 |
| | (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.002) |
| Employed | -0.115*** | -0.106*** | 0.011 | -0.109 |
| | (0.041) | (0.038) | (0.031) | (0.069) |
| Married | 0.014 | -0.029 | 0.016 | -0.047 |
| | (0.041) | (0.038) | (0.030) | (0.064) |
| Has a High School degree | -0.105*** | -0.024 | 0.117*** | 0.253*** |
| | (0.039) | (0.037) | (0.029) | (0.066) |
| White | -0.114 | -0.039 | 0.104 | 0.062 |
| | (0.101) | (0.093) | (0.077) | (0.186) |
| Black or Pardo | -0.109 | -0.032 | 0.113 | 0.017 |
| | (0.103) | (0.096) | (0.079) | (0.191) |
| Controls | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Municipal FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Num. Obs | 869 | 948 | 1396 | 1353 |
| R Squared | 0.068 | 0.032 | 0.052 | 0.046 |
| *Note:* | | | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 |

**Notes**: The table illustrates the OLS coefficients for regression controlling for respondent's gender, age, employment status, if the individual is married, and if the individual has a high school degree. The models also include municipal fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. (Telles 2014)

Unfortunately, I had no access to data regarding the content of these conversations. However, I included a battery of questions within the survey intended to measure individuals' conceptions regarding their society's hierarchical structure. I asked individuals if they agreed that an ideal society needs some groups to be on top and others on the bottom, if some groups of people are just inferior to others, and if a group of people should dominate all the rest. I then recoded these variables so they all show increases in support for hierarchy with larger numbers and constructed a *hierarchy index* using principal component analysis between the

three variables. With this index, I run the fixed effects model in Column 4 of Table 4. The results show that individuals with European ancestry support more hierarchical views of society.

Taken together, the results from this section suggest the significance of familial and social networks in shaping attitudes toward affirmative action policies among individuals with European ancestry. The intergenerational transmission of political preferences, as evidenced by the correlation between parental voting behavior and that of their children, suggests a deep-rooted influence of familial socialization. Moreover, the heightened propensity for discussing politics within households among individuals with European ancestry further indicates the role of the family in reinforcing and perpetuating certain ideological perspectives.

# 7 Some robustness tests

Several issues could affect the results shown in the previous sections. Previously, I presented some analyses that respond to some of the questions related to migrants' sorting within historically treated areas. In this section, I provide additional information about the robustness of the main results. I focus on issues about external validity and whether distance results are robust to different specifications.

**External validity** Concerns regarding the external validity of the results merit consideration, given this paper's emphasis on the State of São Paulo. The survey used in this study was administered online, potentially biasing the sample towards wealthier and more urban individuals with greater internet access. Given that individuals with higher incomes may harbor stronger opposition to affirmative action measures, this could introduce bias into the results. Furthermore, the survey data is limited to individuals residing in São Paulo, restricting the generalizability of the findings to other regions.

To address these concerns, I use data from the 2010 PERLA project (Telles 2014), which conducted representative surveys across Brazil and included questions on European ancestry

and attitudes towards affirmative action. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 display the results of regression models with controls similar to those used in Table 1. The findings indicate that, on the whole, individuals with European ancestry are less supportive of affirmative action measures for access to higher education for Black Brazilians. Moreover, Column 2 reveals that this effect is particularly pronounced in states in Southern Brazil where migration was often subsidized by local governments. Thus, this suggests more general trends within the Brazilian population on the relationship between ancestry and support for affirmative action.

Table 5: Support for Affirmative Action and European Ancestry using the LAPOP/Perla dataset

| | *Dependent variable:* | |
|---|---|---|
| | Support for Affirmative action policies for Blacks in Higher Ed | |
| | Perla All | Perla - South |
| | (1) | (2) |
| European Ancestry | -0.058* | -0.119*** |
| | (0.034) | (0.040) |
| Female | -0.001 | -0.028 |
| | (0.028) | (0.035) |
| Age | 0.001 | 0.0004 |
| | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| White | -0.012 | 0.075 |
| | (0.054) | (0.071) |
| Black | 0.033 | 0.098 |
| | (0.051) | (0.070) |
| Employed | 0.015 | 0.007 |
| | (0.029) | (0.037) |
| Married | 0.059** | 0.081** |
| | (0.028) | (0.036) |
| High School degree | 0.063 | 0.048 |
| | (0.043) | (0.050) |
| Controls | YES | YES |
| Region FE | YES | YES |
| Observations | 802 | 499 |
| $R^2$ | 0.064 | 0.046 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.049 | 0.029 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.376 (df = 788) | 0.384 (df = 489) |
| F Statistic | 4.174*** (df = 13; 788) | 2.644*** (df = 9; 489) |
| *Note:* | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 |

**Notes**: The table illustrates the OLS coefficients for regression controlling for respondent's gender, age, employment status, if the individual is married, and if the individual has a high school degree. The models also include municipal fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. The sample from column (1) contains all people who responded the PERLA survey in 2010 while column (3) is subset to only those individuals who live in the Southern regions of the country. (Telles 2014)

**Robustness to the distance measures** To test the robustness of the distance measure,

I conduct three types of tests. First, I create a series of indicator variables that divide the sample into two groups depending on a distance cutoff point. These cutoff points were conducted at 20, 50, 100, 200, and 500 Km. Then, I run the same estimations as in Section 2 with these variables instead of the continuous measure for distance. The results can be seen in columns 1 - 5 in Table B10. It is plausible to see that after 50 Km, the coefficient for the dummy starts being negative and statistically significant for most models, indicating that individuals who are closer to the colonial settlements have lower support for affirmative action.

In Table B12, I test how the correlations between distance and support for affirmative action change using the individuals living within different distance bandwidths. We would expect that people living very close to the European settlements to have lower support for affirmative action and, as we move farther away to increase their support. I find suggestive evidence this is the case for people living between 0 and more than 500 Km. Table B12 illustrates that the distance coefficient is positive and statistically significant.

# 8 Other Political Effects of the European Settlements

In this section, I explore some of the more practical implications of the results found thus far. Particularly, I focus on two things. First, I see if the effects of affirmative action expand to other measures of inequality, including support for race-blind forms of democracy (*democracia racial*) and preferences over the role of government on inequality. Second, I take advantage of Brazil's data on the candidates' race to the municipal legislative bodies (*vereadores*) to see if places that held colonial settlements tend to select more white politicians.

As explained in the section about affirmative action in Brazil, another way to measure the effects of racial hierarchies and attitudes is to measure support for "racial democracy." This belief promotes the notion that Brazilian society was neither enhanced nor stratified by race

(Freyre 2019; Guimarães 2006; Nobles 2000; Weinstein 2015) and has often been critiqued as a strategy to undermine Brazil's black movement and a race-blind approach to democracy. Table B7 displays the results of a series of fixed effects regressions similar to those on Table C5. The estimates indicate that individuals with European ancestry support the idea of *democracia racial* 4.8% more often than the general population. Similarly, individuals living farther away from European settlements have lower support for *democracia racial*.

Furthermore, Table B8 examines the impact of European ancestry and proximity to European settlements on support for government intervention to reduce inequality. The coefficients present a nuanced picture, overall suggesting that exposure to European migrant colonies may diminish support for redistribution efforts. Specifically, individuals with European ancestry tend to exhibit reduced endorsement of government intervention to address inequality. Conversely, the coefficient associated with respondents residing farther from these settlements fails to achieve statistical significance, indicating a less clear-cut relationship in this regard.

Finally, it is also plausible that these European settlements have long-term consequences on public opinion and other areas of politics. Suppose these settlements promoted the idea of whitening the population. In that case, it can be expected that political candidates who win office in these places tend to be whiter than their counterparts in municipalities without European settlements. Taking advantage of Brazil's data on the racial self-identification of candidates to local councils in 2016 before racial quotas were enacted in the country, I ran a fixed-effects model with clustered standard errors at the NEPO level. Table 6 shows that the proportion of white winners is 5% larger than candidates from other races in municipalities with European settlements. The results also illustrate that the proportion of winning Black candidates in municipalities with European settlements is 2% less than in municipalities without these institutions.

Table 6: Number of White and Black Winners for Local Councils in 2016

| Dependent Variables: | White Winners (Proportion) | Black Winners (Proportion) |
|---|---|---|
| Model: | (1) | (2) |
| *Variables* | | |
| European Settlement | 0.0592*** | -0.0290** |
| | (0.0043) | (0.0141) |
| Area (Km2) | $1.96 \times 10^{-5}$* | $1.1 \times 10^{-5}$ |
| | $(1.18 \times 10^{-5})$ | $(1.6 \times 10^{-5})$ |
| Population 2010 | $1.48 \times 10^{-8}$*** | $-1.78 \times 10^{-8}$*** |
| | $(3.62 \times 10^{-9})$ | $(6.25 \times 10^{-9})$ |
| Proportion White Candidates | 0.9024*** | |
| | (0.0247) | |
| Proportion Black Candidates | | 0.4082*** |
| | | (0.1099) |
| *Fixed-effects* | | |
| NEPO Areas | Yes | Yes |
| *Fit statistics* | | |
| Observations | 643 | 643 |
| $R^2$ | 0.63417 | 0.32017 |
| Within $R^2$ | 0.48410 | 0.12211 |

*Clustered standard-errors at the NEPO level in parentheses*
*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

# 9 Conclusion

In this paper, I have examined a critical yet often overlooked aspect of Latin American history: the legacies of migratory policies aimed at "whitening" the population through the strategic distribution of assets and migration subsidies. These policies, prevalent in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, were driven by a complex interplay of racist ideologies, economic ambitions, and misguided beliefs in the superiority of European migrants. This paper presents some evidence on how these historical efforts to attract European migrants and provide them with preferential access to land and opportunities within stratified societies

have shaped the contemporary socioeconomic and political landscapes of the countries that implemented them. By analyzing this puzzle in the particular setting of Sao Paulo, Brazil, we gain crucial insights into the deep-rooted racial inequalities and racial disparities that persist in many Latin American nations today

In conclusion, this study illuminates the enduring impact of historical land-settlement policies on the contemporary geography of support for affirmative action. By exploring the persistence of attitudes within the context of European settlements (*N'ucleos coloniais*) in Brazil, I expose the intricate ways in which historical legacies continue to shape present-day beliefs and behaviors.Mostly, these attitudes persist due to geography (given that land is a fixed asset) and socialization (the reproduction of racial hierarchies in the newcomers).

The results from this paper underscore the enduring influence of historical migration policies on the contemporary geography of attitudes and socio-political dynamics in Sao Paulo. Firstly, the robust correlation between exposure to migration settlement policies and decreased support for affirmative action measures highlights the far-reaching consequences of these historical interventions for in/group and out/group dynamics. This relationship is further validated through comparisons across states and municipalities with differing migratory policies, wherein individuals with European ancestry in São Paulo exhibit notably lower levels of support for affirmative action compared to counterparts in Minas Gerais. Furthermore, intensive margin analysis reinforces these patterns, revealing that additional migrant ancestors are associated with decreased affirmative action support. Moreover, historical data on migrant landholdings elucidate stronger effects in municipalities with a higher proportion of European landowners in 1905.

I also find suggestive evidence that the intergenerational transmission of political preferences, as evidenced by correlations between parental voting behavior and that of their children, emphasizes the deep-rooted impact of familial socialization on attitudes towards affirmative action. Furthermore, exposure to migratory policies seems to be correlated with support for rae-blind views of democracy (*democracia racial*) as well as the role of government

in dealing with inequality. Additionally, the analysis of municipal election outcomes highlights disparities in political representation, with municipalities who had European settlements demonstrating higher proportions of white-winning candidates and lower proportions of winning Black-winning candidates, further reflecting the enduring legacies of historical migration policies

In going forward with this line of research, I also believe it to be important to deepen the analysis of cross-generation interactions both theoretically and empirically. Understanding how attitudes towards affirmative action are transmitted across generations is crucial for comprehensively grasping the long-term effects of migratory policies on contemporary societal attitudes. Refining methodologies to identify individuals directly exposed to migratory policies or their descendants, such as surname matching or utilizing census records to determine their residence at the time of exposure, could provide valuable insights into intergenerational transmission patterns.

Moreover, future studies should broaden their scope to include regions beyond São Paulo, encompassing areas in Southern Brazil like Santa Catarina, Paraná, and Rio Grande do Sul. These regions not only boast larger migrant populations but also offer distinct contexts where disparities between black and white populations may be more pronounced, thereby enriching our understanding of affirmative action's relevance in addressing inequalities. Additionally, exploring variations within European ancestry and other migrant ancestries, alongside investigating the impact of historical attitudes on contemporary immigration discourse and policymaking, will offer comprehensive insights into the intersection of historical legacies and contemporary societal dynamics, guiding more informed interventions and policies aimed at fostering social equity and inclusivity in diverse societies.

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# A Survey details

The survey employed in this study adopts a convenience sampling approach that aligns with the demographic profile of both Brazil and the state of Sao Paulo. Table A1 delineates the quotas utilized in the sampling process, stratified by gender, age, and residency status within the city of Sao Paulo, thereby mirroring the most recent census data (2022). Comprising nine modules, the survey, depicted in Figure A1, encompasses questions concerning family background alongside questions of racial preferences. Furthermore, two additional modules examining attitudes toward redistribution and migration were included, with their sequence randomized in light of insights gleaned from Alesina, Miano, et al. (2023).

Figure A1: Survey Flow




The survey was distributed through Netquest's opt-in online panel between July 26t and August 11, 2023 with a soft launch/pilot in July 13th 2023. The median length of interview (LOI) was 18 minutes. The rate of response was 95.8%. For those who finished the entire survey, a compensation of $1.11 USD was given to participants to be used in Netquest's exchange platform. Partial compensation was given to those expelled from the survey because they failed at least one of the attention checks. The final sample contained 1600 people from the state of Sao Paulo and 650 from the state of Minas Gerais.

From the entirety of gathered surveys, I excluded those failing to meet one of the survey's attention checks, those lacking data pertaining to their municipality, individuals who rushed through (less than 3 minutes) or took an exceptionally long time (more than 63 minutes) answering the survey, and all respondents who did not complete the survey. Additionally, surveys captured during the initial soft launch on July 4 were omitted, as alterations were introduced to the survey instrument after to this initial pilot phase. At the end, these left 2071 surveys from which 1457 were from the State of Sao Paulo and 614 from the state of

Table A1: Quota Percentages for the Survey

| Variable | Quota | Sample |
|---|---|---|
| Men | 49.9% | Entire Sample |
| Women | 50.7% | Entire Sample |
| 18–24 | 20.8% | Entire Sample |
| 25–34 | 20.9% | Entire Sample |
| 35–44 | 19.4% | Entire Sample |
| 45–54 | 15.5% | Entire Sample |
| 55–64 | 11.8% | Entire Sample |
| 65–99 | 11.2% | Entire Sample |
| City of Sao Paulo | 35.8% | State of Sao Paulo sample |

Minas Gerais.

# B Additional Tables

Table B2: Descriptive Statistics for the Sao Paulo sample

| Statistic | N | Mean | St. Dev. | Min | Pctl(25) | Pctl(75) | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Support Affirmative Action - Black higher ed | 1,403 | 0.52 | 0.50 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Support Affirmative Action - Indigenous higher ed | 1,404 | 0.53 | 0.50 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Support Affirmative Action - Poor higher ed | 1,407 | 0.74 | 0.44 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Support Affirmative Action - Black Public Service | 1,358 | 0.42 | 0.49 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Support for *Racial Democracy* | 1,428 | 0.15 | 0.36 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Government need to reduce inequality | 1,404 | 0.78 | 0.42 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Hierarchy | 1,394 | 0.13 | 0.34 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Distance to Col Settlement (100Km) | 1,456 | 1.55 | 10.42 | 0.0004 | 0.03 | 0.19 | 136.07 |
| Female | 1,456 | 0.47 | 0.50 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Age | 1,457 | 43.26 | 14.78 | 18 | 31 | 54 | 87 |
| Employed | 1,451 | 0.57 | 0.49 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Married | 1,443 | 0.48 | 0.50 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Has High-School degree | 1,457 | 0.57 | 0.49 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| White | 1,438 | 0.69 | 0.46 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Black and Pardo | 1,438 | 0.28 | 0.45 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| European Ancestry | 1,457 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Intensity of Migrant Ancestry | 1,457 | 1.09 | 1.51 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 7 |
| Asian Ancestry | 1,457 | 0.04 | 0.21 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |

Table B3: Balance table for municipalities with and without Colonial Settlements in 1872

| | No Settlement | | | With Settlement | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | n | mean | sd | n | mean | sd | Diff |
| Free Population 1872 (%) | 66 | 0.82 | 0.10 | 23 | 0.82 | 0.11 | -0.009 |
| Enslaved Population 1872 (%) | 66 | 0.18 | 0.10 | 23 | 0.18 | 0.11 | 0.009 |
| Gender rate (woman/men) | 66 | 0.93 | 0.09 | 23 | 0.93 | 0.08 | 0.000 |
| White Population 1872 (%) | 66 | 0.52 | 0.11 | 23 | 0.54 | 0.10 | 0.025 |
| Parda Population 1872 (%) | 66 | 0.24 | 0.07 | 23 | 0.22 | 0.05 | -0.025 |
| Black Population 1872 (%) | 66 | 0.19 | 0.08 | 23 | 0.20 | 0.08 | 0.014 |
| Cabocla Population 1872 (%) | 66 | 0.05 | 0.03 | 23 | 0.04 | 0.02 | -0.014* |
| Native Population 1872 (%) | 66 | 0.98 | 0.03 | 23 | 0.96 | 0.03 | -0.014** |
| Foreign Population 1872 (%) | 66 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 23 | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.014** |
| Religious workers 1872 (%) | 66 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 23 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.000 |
| Judicial workers 1872 (%) | 66 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 23 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.000 |
| Military workers 1872 (%) | 66 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 23 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.000 |
| Capitalistas and property owners 1872 (%) | 66 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 23 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.000 |
| Commercial workers 1872 (%) | 66 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 23 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.000 |
| Agricultural workers 1872 (%) | 66 | 0.38 | 0.11 | 23 | 0.38 | 0.11 | 0.006 |
| Not a worker 1872 (%) | 66 | 0.36 | 0.11 | 23 | 0.35 | 0.13 | -0.005 |
| People who read and write (%) | 66 | 0.13 | 0.08 | 23 | 0.16 | 0.08 | 0.024 |

Table B4: Support for Affirmative Action: Full model

| | *Dependent variable: Support for Affirmative Action for Blacks - Higher Ed (Normalized)* | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | European Ancestry | European Ancestry | European Ancestry | Distance | Distance | Distance | Interaction |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| European Ancestry | -0.209*** | -0.206*** | -0.096* | | | | -0.102* |
| | (0.054) | (0.057) | (0.057) | | | | (0.058) |
| Distance to NC | | | | 0.006*** | 0.007*** | 0.007*** | 0.008** |
| | | | | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.002) | (0.004) |
| Female | | | 0.180*** | | | 0.177*** | 0.175*** |
| | | | (0.057) | | | (0.057) | (0.057) |
| Age | | | -0.017*** | | | -0.018*** | -0.017*** |
| | | | (0.002) | | | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| Employed | | | -0.043 | | | -0.041 | -0.043 |
| | | | (0.060) | | | (0.060) | (0.060) |
| Married | | | -0.168*** | | | -0.172*** | -0.172*** |
| | | | (0.059) | | | (0.059) | (0.059) |
| High School Degree | | | 0.024 | | | -0.001 | 0.015 |
| | | | (0.057) | | | (0.056) | (0.057) |
| Distance X Ancestry | | | | | | | -0.001 |
| | | | | | | | (0.005) |
| Controls | NO | NO | YES | NO | NO | YES | YES |
| NEPO FE | NO | YES | YES | NO | YES | YES | YES |
| Num. Obs | 1366 | 1366 | 1360 | 1365 | 1365 | 1359 | 1359 |
| R Squared | 0.011 | 0.067 | 0.155 | 0.004 | 0.062 | 0.092 | 0.093 |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

**Notes**: The table illustrates the OLS coefficients for regression controlling for respondent's gender, age, employment status, if the individual is married and if the individual has a high school degree. The models also include fixed effects for the historical region they live in. These regions are defined using historical Paulista regions determined by the Núcleo de Estudos de População Elza Berquó. Robust standard errors in parenthesis

Table B5: Other Comparisons: Full model

| Dependent Variable: | Normalized Support for Affirmative Action for Blacks in Higher Education | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Just Respondents with European Ancestry (1) | Migrant Ful (2) | All Paulista Migrants (3) | Top Landholdings (1904) (4) | Top Area (1904) (5) |
| *Variables* | | | | | |
| Lives in Sao Paulo | -0.1515** | | | | |
| | (0.0717) | | | | |
| Number of Migrant Ancestors | | -0.0547*** | | | |
| | | (0.0127) | | | |
| European Ancestry | | | 0.1352 | -0.1123*** | -0.0575 |
| | | | (0.1452) | (0.0266) | (0.0622) |
| Female | 0.2555*** | 0.1758*** | 0.2362** | 0.1918*** | 0.2434*** |
| | (0.0612) | (0.0521) | (0.0905) | (0.0438) | (0.0718) |
| Age | -0.0158*** | -0.0159*** | -0.0164*** | -0.0184*** | -0.0169*** |
| | (0.0020) | (0.0013) | (0.0017) | (0.0012) | (0.0011) |
| Employed | -0.0587 | -0.0432 | -0.1576** | -0.0946** | -0.0591 |
| | (0.0748) | (0.0535) | (0.0670) | (0.0438) | (0.0377) |
| Married | -0.1715*** | -0.1703** | -0.1896*** | -0.1734* | -0.2613*** |
| | (0.0544) | (0.0691) | (0.0696) | (0.0875) | (0.0472) |
| Has a High School degree | 0.0164 | 0.0274 | 0.0591 | 0.0160 | -0.0071 |
| | (0.0559) | (0.0375) | (0.0425) | (0.0483) | (0.0620) |
| Constant | 0.7248*** | | | | |
| | (0.1291) | | | | |
| NEPO FE | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Sao Paulo Sample | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Minas Gerais Sample | Yes | No | No | No | No |
| Observations | 874 | 1,360 | 745 | 847 | 740 |
| $R^2$ | 0.12088 | 0.15880 | 0.21263 | 0.14618 | 0.17000 |

*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

**Notes**: The table illustrates the OLS coefficients for regression controlling for respondent's gender, age, employment status, if the individual is married and if the individual has a high school degree. The models also include fixed effects for the historical region they live in. These regions are defined using historical Paulista regions determined by the Núcleo de Estudos de População Elza Berquó. Standard errors were clustered at either the municipality region (column (1)) or the historical region (columns (2) – (5))

Table B6: Support for Other forms of Affirmative Action

| | *Indigenous Higher Ed* | | *Poor Higher Ed* | | *Black Public Service* | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | European Ancestry | Distance | European Ancestry | Distance | European Ancestry | Distance |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| European Ancestry | -0.034 | | -0.018 | | -0.059** | |
| | (0.029) | | (0.025) | | (0.029) | |
| Distance | | 0.003** | | 0.002*** | | 0.004*** |
| | | (0.001) | | (0.001) | | (0.001) |
| Female | 0.087*** | 0.086*** | 0.035 | 0.034 | 0.084*** | 0.082*** |
| | (0.028) | (0.028) | (0.025) | (0.025) | (0.028) | (0.028) |
| Age | -0.007*** | -0.007*** | -0.005*** | -0.005*** | -0.008*** | -0.008*** |
| | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Employed | 0.017 | 0.018 | 0.018 | 0.018 | -0.033 | -0.032 |
| | (0.030) | (0.030) | (0.027) | (0.027) | (0.030) | (0.030) |
| Married | -0.071** | -0.074** | -0.014 | -0.015 | -0.076*** | -0.077*** |
| | (0.029) | (0.029) | (0.026) | (0.026) | (0.029) | (0.029) |
| High School degree | -0.014 | -0.024 | 0.025 | 0.019 | 0.011 | -0.003 |
| | (0.028) | (0.028) | (0.025) | (0.025) | (0.028) | (0.028) |
| Controls | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| NEPO FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Num. Obs | 1398 | 1397 | 1401 | 1400 | 1353 | 1352 |
| R Squared | 0.072 | 0.074 | 0.04 | 0.042 | 0.074 | 0.075 |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

**Notes**: The table illustrates the OLS coefficients for regression controlling for respondent's gender, age, employment status, if the individual is married and if the individual has a high school degree. The models also include fixed effects for the historical region they live in. These regions are defined using historical Paulista regions determined by the Núcleo de Estudos de População Elza Berquó. Robust standard errors in parenthesis

Table B7: Support for Racial Democracy

| | *Dependent variable:* | |
|---|---|---|
| | European Ancestry | Distance to a ES |
| | (1) | (2) |
| European Ancestry | 0.048** | |
| | (0.021) | |
| Distance | | -0.002** |
| | | (0.001) |
| Female | -0.077*** | -0.077*** |
| | (0.020) | (0.020) |
| Age | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Employed | 0.003 | 0.002 |
| | (0.022) | (0.022) |
| Married | 0.041* | 0.043** |
| | (0.022) | (0.022) |
| High School degree | 0.017 | 0.027 |
| | (0.020) | (0.020) |
| Controls | YES | YES |
| NEPO FE | YES | YES |
| Num. Obs | 1422 | 1421 |
| R Squared | 0.044 | 0.041 |
| *Note:* | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 | |

**Notes**: The table illustrates the OLS coefficients for regression controlling for respondent's gender, age, employment status, if the individual is married and if the individual has a high school degree. The models also include fixed effects for the historical region they live in. These regions are defined using historical Paulista regions according to the Núcleo de Estudos de População Elza Berquó. Robust standard errors in parenthesis

Table B8: Support for Government should reduce inequality

| | *Dependent variable:* | |
|---|---|---|
| | European Ancestry | Distance to a ES |
| | (1) | (2) |
| European Ancestry | -0.106*** | |
| | (0.024) | |
| Distance | | 0.001 |
| | | (0.001) |
| Female | 0.102*** | 0.103*** |
| | (0.024) | (0.024) |
| Age | 0.0003 | -0.0004 |
| | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Employed | 0.005 | 0.007 |
| | (0.026) | (0.026) |
| Married | -0.032 | -0.034 |
| | (0.025) | (0.025) |
| High School degree | -0.015 | -0.034 |
| | (0.024) | (0.024) |
| Controls | YES | YES |
| NEPO FE | YES | YES |
| Num. Obs | 1398 | 1397 |
| R Squared | 0.035 | 0.02 |
| *Note:* | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 | |

**Notes**: The table illustrates the OLS coefficients for regression controlling for respondent's gender, age, employment status, if the individual is married, and if the individual has a high school degree. The models also include fixed effects for the historical region they live in. These regions are defined using historical Paulista regions according to the Núcleo de Estudos de População Elza Berquó. Robust standard errors in parenthesis

Table B9: Support for the prompt that is just in a society to have some groups better than others

| | *Dependent variable:* | |
|---|---|---|
| | European Ancestry | Distance to a ES |
| | (1) | (2) |
| European Ancestry | -0.039 | |
| | (0.025) | |
| Distance | | 0.002*** |
| | | (0.001) |
| Female | 0.095*** | 0.094*** |
| | (0.025) | (0.025) |
| Age | 0.002* | 0.002 |
| | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Employed | 0.007 | 0.008 |
| | (0.027) | (0.027) |
| Married | -0.037 | -0.039 |
| | (0.026) | (0.026) |
| High School degree | -0.034 | -0.045* |
| | (0.025) | (0.025) |
| Controls | YES | YES |
| NEPO FE | YES | YES |
| Num. Obs | 1406 | 1405 |
| R Squared | 0.015 | 0.016 |
| *Note:* | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 | |

**Notes**: The table illustrates the OLS coefficients for regression controlling for respondent's gender, age, employment status, if the individual is married and if the individual has a high school degree. The models also include fixed effects for the historical region they live in. These regions are defined using historical Paulista regions according to the Núcleo de Estudos de População Elza Berquó. Robust standard errors in parenthesis

Table B10: Different Distance Measures

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| dist <= 0.2K | 0.005 | | | | |
| | (0.047) | | | | |
| dist <= 0.5K | | -0.108* | | | |
| | | (0.062) | | | |
| dist <= 1K | | | -0.187** | | |
| | | | (0.074) | | |
| dist <= 2K | | | | -0.125 | |
| | | | | (0.106) | |
| dist <= 5K | | | | | -0.234* |
| | | | | | (0.142) |
| Controls | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| NEPO FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Num. Obs | 1331 | 1331 | 1331 | 1331 | 1331 |
| *Note:* | | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 | | |

**Notes**: The table illustrates the OLS coefficients for regression controlling for respondent's gender, age, employment status, if the individual is married, and if the individual has a high school degree. The models also include fixed effects for the historical region they live in. These regions are defined using historical Paulista regions according to the Núcleo de Estudos de População Elza Berquó. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Each row presents the coefficients of a distance dummy less than or equal to 20, 50, 100, 200, and 500 Km. Model 6 presents the result of the logged distance measure.

Table B11: Hierarchical Index

| | *Dependent variable:* | |
|---|---|---|
| | NA | |
| | Migrant Family | Distance |
| | (1) | (2) |
| European Family | 0.248*** | |
| | (0.063) | |
| Distance to European Settlement (100 Km) | | -0.001 |
| | | (0.003) |
| Controls | YES | YES |
| NEPO FE | YES | YES |
| Observations | 1,353 | 1,352 |
| $R^2$ | 0.211 | 0.200 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.046 | 0.033 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.952 (df = 1119) | 0.959 (df = 1118) |
| *Note:* | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 |

Table B12: Restraining the Sample Geographically

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Full Sample | 0-20Km | 0-100Km | 0-200Km | 0-500Km | 0-700Km |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| European Settlement (Distance) | 0.046** | -0.367 | -0.110 | 0.095 | 0.067* | 0.053** |
| | (0.020) | (0.352) | (0.127) | (0.065) | (0.038) | (0.024) |
| Controls | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| NEPO FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Num. Obs | 1331 | 1057 | 1275 | 1308 | 1323 | 1329 |
| *Note:* | | | | | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 |

**Notes**: The table illustrates the OLS coefficients for regression controlling for respondent's gender, age, employment status, if the individual is married and if the individual has a high school degree. The models also include fixed effects for the historical region they live in. These regions are defined using historical Paulista regions according to the Núcleo de Estudos de População Elza Berquó. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Each column presents the coefficients of the model restricting the sample to individuals living at determined levels of distance in the sample.

Table B13: List of Colonial Settlements in Sao Paulo (1827-1933)

| Current Municipality | Name of Colonial Settlement | Creation Year | Municipality in 1872 |
|---|---|---|---|
| São Bernardo do Campo | Santo Amaro (Vila Mariana) | 1827 | São Paulo |
| Itapecerica da Serra | Itapecerica | 1829 | Santo Amaro |
| Cordeirópolis | Ibicaba | 1847 | Limeira |
| Campinas | Sete Quedas | 1852 | Campinas |
| Corumbatai | S José do Corumbataí | 1852 | Rio Claro |
| Corumbataí | Corumbataí | 1852 | Rio Claro |
| Jundiaí | Morro Grande | 1852 | Jundiaí |
| Limeira | Morro Azul | 1852 | Limeira |
| Limeira | Sao Jerônimo | 1852 | Limeira |
| Rio Claro | Beri | 1852 | Rio Claro |
| Rio Claro | S Joao do Morro Grande | 1852 | Rio Claro |
| Rio Claro | Boa Visa (Morro Grande) | 1852 | Rio Claro |
| Rio Claro | Angélica | 1852 | Rio Claro |
| Rio Claro | Covitinga | 1852 | Rio Claro |
| Rio Claro | Sertao de Araraquara | 1852 | Rio Claro |
| Rio Claro | Itaúna | 1852 | Rio Claro |
| Rio Claro | Boa Vista (São João da Bela Vista) | 1852 | Rio Claro |
| Limeira | Tatu | 1854 | Limeira |
| Limeira | Cresciumal | 1854 | Limeira |
| Limeira | Santa Bárbara | 1856 | Limeira |
| Limeira | Bom Retiro | 1856 | Limeira |
| Limeira | Esparandonga | 1856 | Limeira |
| Limeira | Palmira | 1856 | Limeira |
| Avanhandava | Avanhandava | 1858 | Lençóis Paulista |
| Itapura | Itapura | 1858 | Jaboticabal |
| Pariquera-Açu | Pariquerassú | 1861 | Iguape |

Continued on next page

Table B13: List of Colonial Settlements in Sao Paulo (1827-1933) (Continued)

| Current Municipality | Name of Colonial Settlement | Creation Year | Municipality in 1872 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cananéia | Cananéia | 1862 | Cananéia |
| São Caetano do Sul | São Caetano | 1874 | São Paulo |
| São Bernardo do Campo | São Bernardo | 1876 | São Paulo |
| São Paulo | Glória | 1877 | São Paulo |
| São Paulo | Santana | 1877 | São Paulo |
| Canas | Canas | 1885 | Lorena |
| Cordeirópolis | Cascalho | 1885 | Limeira |
| Jacareí | Boa Vista (São João da Bela Vista) | 1887 | São João da Boa Vista |
| Jundiaí | Barão de Jundiaí | 1887 | Jundiaí |
| Mogi das Cruzes | Sabaúna | 1887 | Mogi das Cruzes |
| Porto Feliz | Conselheiro Rodrigo Silva | 1887 | Porto Feliz |
| Ribeirão Pires | Ribeirão Pires | 1887 | São Paulo |
| Ribeirão Preto | Senador Antonio Prado | 1887 | Ribeirão Preto |
| Sorocaba | Bom Sucesso | 1887 | Sorocaba |
| Taubaté | Quiririm | 1890 | Taubaté |
| Guaratinguetá | Piagui | 1892 | Guaratinguetá |
| Cosmópolis | Campos Sales | 1897 | Campinas |
| Corumbataí | Jorge Tibiriçá | 1905 | Rio Claro |
| Nova Odessa | Nova Odessa | 1905 | Campinas |
| Araraquara | Nova Paulicéia | 1907 | Araraquara |
| Gavião Peixoto | Gavião Peixoto | 1907 | Araraquara |
| Nova Europa | Nova Europa | 1907 | Araraquara |
| Ubatuba | Conde do Pinhal | 1907 | Ubatuba |
| São José do Barreiro | Bandeirantes | 1908 | São José do Barreiro |
| Iaras | Monção | 1910 | Lençóis Paulista |
| Sumaré | Nova Veneza | 1910 | Campinas |

Continued on next page

Table B13: List of Colonial Settlements in Sao Paulo (1827-1933) (Continued)

| Current Municipality | Name of Colonial Settlement | Creation Year | Municipality in 1872 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conchal | Visconde de Indaiatuba | 1911 | Mogi Mirim |
| Juquiá | Juquiá | 1911 | Iguape |
| Mogi Guaçu | Martinho Prado Júnior | 1911 | Mogi Mirim |
| Mogi Mirim | Conde de Parnaíba | 1911 | Mogi Mirim |
| Barão de Antonina | Barão de Antonina | 1930 | Itaporanga |
| Iguapé | Alecrim | 1933 | Iguape |
| Iguapé | Prainha | 1933 | Iguape |
| Itanhaem | Itanhaem | 1933 | Itanhaem |
| São Miguel Arcanjo | São Miguel Arcanjo | 1933 | Itapetininga |
| Registro | Registro | | Iguape |

[a] It is the first footnote.
[†] It is the second long long long long long long footnote.

# C Additional Figures

Figure C2: Number of Migrants arriving to São Paulo by Status (1989-2011)




**Note:** Data comes from the arrival records of São Paulo's Secretary of Agriculture

Figure C3: Number of Migrants arriving to São Paulo by Nationality (1989-2011)




**Note:** Data comes from the arrival records of São Paulo's Secretary of Agriculture

Figure C4: Expenditure on Immigrant Programs and Coffee Export Tax Revenue as percentage of Total Tax Revenue (1892-1928)




**Note:** Data comes from Holloway (1978) and shows the relationship between coffee tax revenues (dotted line) and immigrant expenditures (solid line).

Figure C5: Support for Affirmative Action, Brazil 2010 (percentage of respondents by race and region)




**Source:** LAPOP, 2010.

**Note:** Support for affirmative action policies was coded as one if the respondents selected 5 or more in the agreement scale when asked if they agreed that universities should save spots for afro-Brazilians. Races were defined using LAPOP's skin color scheme. The percentages presented are calculated for each race-region category