Reconstruction and Representation

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Data and analyses are preliminary; please do not circulate without permission.

Abstract

Existing scholarship suggests that peacebuilding troops can facilitate post-conflict peace, but also that external actors often fail to build effective democratic institutions in the presence of ongoing struggles between domestic social groups. We use Reconstruction in the United States, during which the U.S. federal government sought to create multiracial democracy in the U.S. South, to explore how external actors can consolidate post-war peace into long-term statebuilding. We explore three such pathways: 1) the physical protection of minority political activity, 2) the promotion of new laws and legal frameworks, and 3) the enforcement of democratic norms. We combine data on spatial and temporal variation in the presence of federal troops throughout the South with original roll call data from southern state legislatures during and after Reconstruction. Our results suggest that external actors succeed primarily through the protection of minority groups, and speak to the fragility of representation in post-conflict, multi-racial settings.

Can external actors support democratic representation in societies recovering from civil war? Since the end of the Cold War, the international community has centered democracy promotion in its peacebuilding efforts in countries as varied as Mozambique, Cambodia, Croatia, El Salvador, and Liberia. Democracy helps bolster the legitimacy of post-conflict states, supports the rule of law, and secures inclusive access to public goods (Blair, Di Salvatore, and Smidt 2022). To its supporters, democratic representation offers a peaceful mechanism to resolve intergroup grievances that otherwise might lead to violent conflict. At the time of writing, the United Nations deploys nearly 90,000 uniformed personnel and spends more than $6 billion annually on peacekeeping operations designed to support democratic representation in post-conflict settings, and the Biden administration has put the defense of democracy at the core of its foreign policy, with President Biden calling democracy "the heart of all that we hope to achieve."[1]

Its centrality to policy-making notwithstanding, democratic statebuilding's empirical record is mixed and often contradictory. External actors provide blueprints for holding elections, observe the casting of ballots, and offer security protections for minorities (Walter 2002; Walter, Howard, and Fortna 2021). For example, following the civil war in El Salvador in the early 1990s, when the incumbent government in El Salvador tried to disenfranchise voters for its rebel group rivals, the UN sent peacekeeping personnel to voting districts to ensure that all civilians could vote as intended (Matanock 2017). Similarly, reputable international election observers increase participation in electoral politics across domestic groups in weakly institutionalized settings, especially after conflict (Hyde and Marinov 2014; Bush and Prather 2018). Yet other research suggests that third parties do not have consistent impacts on democratic representation (Fortna 2008; Fortna and Huang 2012; Fjelde and Höglund 2011) or may inadvertently support corrupt incumbent governments (Nomikos and Villa 2021) that

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[1] Wong, Edward. "Biden Puts Defense of Democracy at Center of Agenda, at Home and Abroad." *The New York Times* (New York, NY). September 6, 2022.

oppress minority groups (Nomikos, Sener, and Williams 2023). These challenges have become most evident in Mali where coups in 2020 and 2021 reversed any democratic gains made by Malian governments supported by French and UN intervention since 2013. In addition, scholars have found that foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC) fails to construct democratic institutions (Downes and Monten 2013). Normatively, scholars have criticized the centrality of democracy to so-called "liberal peacebuilding" as part of a neo-colonial enterprise (Paris 2004; Chandler 2010; Pierre 2020), and skeptics argue that that external, top-down statebuilding artificially sustains domestic leaders with narrow winning coalitions (Lake 2016) and limits attention to important local conflicts (Autesserre 2010).

In spite of their many contributions, these studies have important limitations. First, they center theoretically on democracy as an outcome in broad terms rather than as an inclusive process resulting in the legislative representation of voters of all social groups. Second, while it is clear that third parties reduce violence in the short-term, it is not obvious that these triumphs translate into successful self-enforcing democracy independent of the external actor presence *even when successful.* Third, existing research tends to overemphasize the role of international actors without considering how domestic politics may upend democratization in the presence of external actors.[2,3] Finally, most prior studies of external actor democracy promotion operationalize democratization using cross-national measures that quantify democratic development over space and time. Even the best such measures, however, cannot capture whether post-conflict democracies elect officials that represent the interests of all social groups in society. Our study seeks to overcome these limitations by providing theory and broad-based evidence exploring how and when democratic

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[2]Melissa Lee calls this the distributional problem of international state-building.

[3]Prominent ideas about peacebuilding argue that belligerents face a cooperation problem in which neither side can credibly commit not to exploit the other. According to these accounts, the role of third parties is to incentivize domestic actors to comply with political bargains that they might otherwise violate or disregard (Matanock 2020). However, domestic actors frequently cannot agree on the distribution of power between social groups in the first place (Barma 2016; Lee 2022).

representation evolves into self-enforcing democracy over time.

Our theoretical framework connects ideas from major theories of international relations with research on U.S. legislative politics and comparative democratization. We argue that while the presence of external actors can have meaningful short-term consequences on political activity and representation, democratization will fail when domestic actors do not have sufficient opportunity to pass legislation, institutionalize norms, and break down social barriers that entrenched the social cleavages that existed before the conflict. In these cases, dominant groups will reverse course as soon as the third party withdraws. Short-term success of third-party intervention to facilitate meaningful political participation and democratic representation is not a sufficient condition for long-run success at incorporating historical out-groups into the political community.

In this paper, we use the case of Reconstruction in the southern United States following the American Civil War to test our theory. We leverage spatial and temporal variation in third-party intervention by the federal (Union) government during and after Reconstruction to investigate the implications of our theory. While it is known that Reconstruction ultimately failed to produce a self-sustaining multi-racial democracy – leading Foner (2014) to call it "America's Unfinished Revolution" – less has been been established about the relative importance of different policy levers for sustaining multiracial democracy *during* Reconstruction and permitting its overthrow *after* Reconstruction.

We operationalize intervention efforts and the establishment of self-enforcing democratic institutions using four unique sources of data. First, we construct an original data set of roll call voting by legislators in the lower chambers of southern state legislatures during the height of Congressional Reconstruction (1870-1871) as well as after the end of Reconstruction (1880-1881). Using these roll call data, we calculate summary measures of legislators' roll call records that measure their revealed ideological preferences on the key cleavages of the legislative session. We then link this data with with information on individual legislators' racial

identities and party affiliations, which we assemble from a variety of primary and secondary sources. Third, we draw on the 1870 and 1880 U.S. Censuses to create measures of racial and socioeconomic characteristics of legislators' districts. Finally, we create district-level measures of federal troop presence using Downs and Nesbit's (2015) detailed data on federal troop presence throughout Reconstruction.

Using these data, we employ a straightforward regression approach to examine how roll call voting varied as a function of district Black population share, federal troop presence, and their interaction. We are particularly interested in this interaction, as it indicates the extent to which federal troops helped to buoy the representation of Black interests in state legislative politics. To help probe the mechanisms of representation, we subsequently incorporate our data on legislator race and party affiliation to examine the extent to which our results are driven by selection of particular legislators, or legislator adaptation to electoral pressures. By studying roll call voting after troop departure as a function of *previous* troop presence, we gain unique purchase on whether troop facilitation of Black voting during Reconstruction generated lasting norms of Black political participation or whether Reconstruction-era gains proved ephemeral or even generated subsequent backlash.

We document four important findings. First, we show that in all Reconstruction-era state legislatures that we study, the primary dimension of legislative conflict pitted Democrats against Republicans – just as might be seen in the U.S. Congress or state legislatures today. Moreover, we present perhaps the most comprehensive quantitative evidence on the preferences of Black elites during this period, showing that in addition to being almost uniformly Republicans at this time, Black state legislators consistently had more extreme ideological preferences than their white Republican co-partisans. Second, we demonstrate that while in many states greater shares of Black residents are associated with more-Republican roll call records during Reconstruction, this effect in a number of states aided by the presence of federal troops. Third, we show that these effects are primarily driven by the election of

legislators who are either Black, Republican, or both. These results are consistent, for example, with evidence that local Black officials during Reconstruction pursued more ambitious taxing and spending programs (Logan 2018). Finally, we show that whatever representational differences were generated by federal troop presence during Reconstruction proved almost entirely ephemeral, suggesting that the brief period of multiracial democracy in the South that troops facilitated was of insufficient duration to create durable norms of Black political equality and participation.

Combined, our results suggest that Federal intervention had some temporary success in the Reconstruction period; both historical and our own evidence, however, show that this success was short-lived. By the end of the 1870s every southern state had overthrown Black Republican political power through violence and fraud, and over the subsequent decades these gains for white supremacy were institutionalized through tools such as poll taxes and literacy tests (Kousser 1974; Olson N.D.). After 1900, Black political participation was all but nonexistent in the South, with whites-only Democratic primary elections and Democratic electoral dominance perpetuating white supremacist rule and the implementation of Jim Crow social segregation and economic discrimination. Ultimately our results are suggestive of the world that Reconstruction might have created, where multi-racial democracy flourished and African Americans had their preferences expressed in southern legislatures; combining these results with the historical record, however, suggests the failure of the Reconstruction democratization project and the limitations of contemporary international efforts for generating lasting consequences for democratic governance. Our results show that external intervention can enforce the inclusion of minority voters in the short-term, but that such intervention cannot change the preferences of dominant groups. With these findings, we contribute to a growing set of studies merging the study of American politcal institutions, and specifically the Reconstruction Era, with international politics (e.g., Stewart and Kitchens 2021).

Three Pathways of Intervention Success

We begin by defining democracy as "a political regime in which rulers are selected through free and contested elections" (Przeworski 2004). Electoral democracy is valuable because it provides leaders with the incentive to pass laws benefitting the public. However, democracy only succeeds when institutions become "self-enforcing" in the sense that (1) leaders hold free elections and (2) citizens do not rebel against leaders (Fearon 2011). When leaders stop holding elections, a democracy deteriorates into a dictatorship. When citizens rebel, the democracy collapses into civil war. In multiethnic and multiracial societies with a dominant group and at least one minority group, self-enforcing democracy requires that elections must enshrine the participation of all minority groups. Minority groups will work to elect legislators that can vote on their behalf in seats of power. The election of these officials is part of the attempt of these civilians to make democracy after conflict self-enforcing and, thus, lasting. If they cannot elect their own officials, minority groups will have a powerful incentive to rebel against the government (Fearon 2011). Over time, the deployment of troops leads to the election of new leaders. All leaders then become incentivized to make cross-cutting appeals in order to gain votes, ensuring further representation for minority groups.

We identify three potential pathways for the success of third-party-supported democratization both during deployment as well as after the withdrawal of military forces. These pathways respectively draw upon insight from rationalist theories of war, liberal institutional IR theory, and normative social constructivist IR theories.

First, consistent with rationalist theories of war, we argue that interveners promote democratic representation by protecting minority groups heading to the ballot box. Third parties deploy troops to protect minority voters, representatives, and legislators, which we posit will have important, local-level effects on democratic representation. Rationalist IR theories typically focus on how international actors enforce political bargains by deploying military

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force (Fearon 1998; Walter 2002; Fortna 2008). Local leaders then have a security guarantee from the international community to protect them should other parties to the conflict return to violence. Accordingly, it is the ability of the international actor to resolve the commitment problem through military power that facilitates democratic growth.

By contrast, our argument is fundamentally local-level: third-party interveners protect civilians in their immediate vicinity during their time of deployment. In other words, the effect of third-party intervention on democratic representation is spatially and temporally contingent. Reinterpreting intervention through this lens has important implications for understanding the legacy of third parties in post-conflict settings. Although external actors may succeed in protecting minorities, whether this protection lasts long enough to enshrine institutional protections on minority voting and develop norms in favor of multigroup democracy remains an open questions that is dependent entirely on the specific context of the deployment.

Hypothesis 1 *There is a positive relationship between minority group population and legislative representation in areas with third-party troops.*

Critically, the magnitude of this representation should further increase in proportion to the strength of the security guarantee that third-party troops can provide. Moreover, we expect this relationship to hold at a local level since the protections offered by third parties cannot extend beyond the reach of their militaries.

Hypothesis 2 *The magnitude of the positive relationship between minority group population and legislative representation is proportional to the size of the third party troop deployment.*

The second pathway of democratization success we identify draws upon liberal institutionalist theories of IR (Keohane 1984; Keohane and Martin 1995). We argue that external peacekeepers lower transaction costs of establishing new authority structures by providing a framework for local loaders to pass new laws, create power-sharing institutions, and hold

multiparty elections. These new institutional structures become focal points around which post-conflict states hold elections.

In the context of our theory, we expect this to shape the representation of minority groups after the withdrawal of the third party. Minority groups elect officials during intervention, those officials revise their societies' institutional framework to ensure that a new rule of law gets enacted. The new laws create a new institutional framework around which minorities can organize voting and other types of political action. Over time, this lowers the transaction cost to democracy that make representative collective action easier for all groups. We should expect this relationship to hold as long as the institutions remain in place.

Hypothesis 3 *During the post-intervention period, there is a positive relationship between minority group population and legislative representation in areas with institutionalized protections of minority groups.*

Finally, building on constructivist IR theories, we highlight the importance of normative change that fundamentally changes the preferences of social groups over time. Ultimately, democratic representation succeeds when third parties facilitate a normative shift in the dominant group. This happens over time as the deployment of troops and democratic representation of the intervention period leads to the election of new leaders. All leaders then become incentivized to make cross-cutting appeals in order to gain votes, leading local groups to increasingly identify with the state (Russell and Sambanis 2022). At the same time, new leaders pass new laws, create new schools, and build new institutions that foster greater normative shifts.

Hypothesis 4 *During the post-intervention period, there is a positive relationship between minority group population and legislative representation in areas that had third-party troops in the pre-intervention period.*

However, it is unclear how long this will take in post-conflict settings and whether third parties can intervene for long enough. Once third parties withdraw, minority voters lose

the protection of the troops in their localities. Because the presence of third parties is not transformative in a nationalizing sense but rather limited in a localized sense, minority groups living in areas that never enjoyed the protection of troops during the intervention period will likely not benefit from increased representation. Moreover, exactly because interventions do not necessarily transform the preferences of dominant group members, we also do not expect that intervention period will result in broader normative changes in areas that did have troops.

There are three scope conditions for our theory. First, the third party must deploy a military force with the legal authority to wield some form of coercive force. This excludes lighter footprint interventions such as Chapter VI or "Traditional" UN Peacekeeping Operations or election monitors. Second, the third party intervention cannot be a full-fledged occupation in which domestic authorities do not have sovereign authority to pass laws. Finally, the post-conflict setting must feature a salient identity dimension according to which inclusive, democratic representation must be established.

Context: Reconstruction and Redemption

Reconstruction in the United States provides a suitable historical context in which to test our theory. This period of American political and military history extends from before the end of the Civil War to 1877, when a compromise brokered to resolve the disputed 1876 Presidential election formally ended federal military presence in the U.S. South. Roughly speaking, one can divide Reconstruction into three periods: Presidential Reconstruction, characterized by President Andrew Johnson's relatively permissive plan to readmit southern states to the Union and the reinstitution of racial hierarchy through "Black Codes"; Congressional Reconstruction, in which so-called "Radical Republicans" in Congress passed the 15th Amendment and Reconstruction Acts to require southern states to admit Black men to the elective franchise; and a decline phase, beginning at different times in each state, characterized by waning northern

support for protecting Black civil rights.[4]

As part of the Reconstruction Acts' requirements, southern states seeking readmission to the Union were required to allow freed Black men to vote and run for office. Radical Reconstruction began in earnest in 1867, and most southern states were readmitted between 1868 and 1871. We focus on the first legislature elected after readmission for nearly all states. We do so in an effort to focus on the period in each state when they were self-governing, but when African Americans were able to vote relatively unmolested and party competition was at its peak.

While southern states passed new constitutions, which included manhood suffrage as a condition of readmission, potential Black voters and officeholders faced violence from the Ku Klux Klan and other groups who aimed to maintain the white-dominant political status quo. The federal government responded with the Enforcement Acts, which allowed for the use of military force to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. As a result, troop presence persisted throughout the South until the end of Reconstruction.

This time of occupation and subsequent withdrawal provides a unique historical instance of statebuilding in a region fraught with racial conflict. In addition, record keeping for Black officeholders and troop deployment have allowed for a broad range of analyses on the Reconstruction period. Existing works on Reconstruction focus on one of two main themes; either the representational effects of Reconstruction, or the socio-economic outcomes federal intervention was able to secure for Black citizens.

While most early historical scholarship on Reconstruction, centered around the so-called "Dunning School," offered a deeply racist portrait of inept Black officeholders, subsequent scholarship, beginning with Du Bois (1998) and finding perhaps its fullest expression in Foner (2014), emphasized the impressive strides that Black officeholders made in a relatively short and fraught period of time. Subsequent quantitative scholarship has found that descriptive representation provided benefits for Black voters. Utilizing data on Black officeholders, Logan

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[4]For the definitive history and interpretation of Reconstruction, see Foner (2014).

([2018](#)) found that the presence of a Black official in a county improved both re-distributional outcomes (an increase in per capita tax collections) and social outcomes (a reduction in the literacy gap) during Reconstruction. Similar trends have been found at the federal level; Black Republicans in Congress in the era tended to be more liberal in their voting patterns than their white counterparts ([Cobb and Jenkins 2001](#)).

In recent years, scholarly works have focused on the consequences of federal intervention. The presence of both Freedmen's Bureau field offices ([Rogowski 2018](#)) and Union troops ([Stewart and Kitchens 2021](#)) were found to be correlated with improved literacy rates, political participation, and a reduction in social outcome gaps relative to those where less intervention was present. Troop presence also led to improved economic outcomes, as counties with larger Black populations saw higher tax levies than similar counties where troops were not present, and there was less political violence in occupied counties ([Chacón and Jensen 2020](#)). The long-term effects of these policies were mixed however; while the literacy improvements tended to have longer-lasting effects, economic improvements were quickly reversed after Union troops withdrew, while political violence spiked ([Mazumder 2019](#)).

While some work has demonstrated that troop presence allowed for increased descriptive representation in southern legislatures ([Chacón and Jensen 2020](#); [Chacón, Jensen, and Yntiso 2021](#)), we go a step further by systematically considering the *substantive* representation of Black political preferences in state legislatures across the South during and after Reconstruction.

Data

In order to test our theoretical framework linking third-party intervention and democratic representation through the hypothesized pathways in the U.S. South after the civil war, we rely on a variety of data sources. We use data on the location of Federal troops in the South *during* Reconstruction (1865-1877) to identify local-level variation in third-party troop

deployment. We use data from the U.S. Census to characterize the demographic and economic characteristics of legislators' districts. Finally, we measure democratic representation by connecting data on Black population share of a given area with the legislative voting records of local state representatives. This process allows us to empirically evaluate the ideological representativeness of elected officials, an indicator for whether voting records reflect the preferences of all social groups, not just dominant groups. In this section we describe our original data collection of state legislative roll call data in the Reconstruction-era South, additional legislator-level data we have assembled, our implementation of existing data on Reconstruction-era troop locations, and demographic information from the U.S. Census.

Original State Legislative Roll Call Data

Our primary outcome of interest is roll call voting behavior by legislators in the lower chambers of southern state legislatures. Roll call voting is frequently used in analyses of representation in the United States (e.g. Miller and Stokes 1963), and offers a number of advantages for our purposes. First, roll call voting is a recorded expression of a legislator's revealed preferences. While any number of factors may weigh on a legislator's mind while voting – such as their personal preferences, their constituents' preferences, or party pressures – the ultimate vote choice reflects their assessment of these various pressures (Levitt 1996). Second, roll call voting is readily observable by constituents and can therefore be appropriately thought of as an easily monitored form of legislative behavior for which a legislator can expect to be held accountable. This is likely to be particularly important in the time period we study, when newspapers offered extensive coverage of state legislative proceedings. Finally, roll call voting is an activity in which all legislators must participate. While writing bills, interacting with colleagues and organized interests, and exerting effort on behalf of constituents are all, to some degree, voluntary activities, roll call voting is one of the few near-requirements of the job of being a legislator. These facts have combined to make roll call voting one of the most common

approaches for learning about legislators' preferences and understanding how or if they are representing their constituents' interests.[5]

To collect roll call data from the periods during and shortly after Reconstruction, we assembled a collection of digitized legislative journals from a variety of sources.[6] These journals cover nine states of the former Confederacy both during and after Reconstruction. We include one biennial session per state for each time period, which corresponds to a single legislative election cycle for most states, and include all regular and special legislative sessions during that biennium – see Table 1 for the legislative sessions included for each state.[7] For our sample of years during Reconstruction, we focus on the legislature elected in the first election after re-admission to the Union. For our "after Reconstruction" time period, we focus on legislative sessions during 1880 and 1881.

Using the journals as well as outside sources, we created rosters of legislators for each state-session. With these rosters in hand, we scraped the journal PDFs to identify the roll call votes and extract the "yeas" and "nays." The result of this procedure is a separate dataset for each state. These datasets, called "roll call matrices," contain the unique legislators as observations, and the unique roll calls as features, and encode each legislator's vote choice on a given bill with a 0 (for "nay"), a 1 (for "yea"), or a missing entry (for abstention).

While these roll call matrices contain an extraordinary amount of information, it is not feasible to use the roll call data directly in our analyses. Instead we require a method to allow us to reduce the dimensionality of the roll call data and distill its important features. To do this we turn to ideal point estimation, an approach popularized by Poole and Rosenthal (1997) as a way to summarize legislators' roll call records. In the same spirit as factor analysis or multi-

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[5]Of course, roll call voting is not a perfect measure. Most importantly, some scholarship emphasizes that not all votes are recorded roll calls – and that on- and off-record votes are likely to be strategically chosen (e.g. Ainsley et al. 2020).

[6]These journals were primarily from the Law Library Microform Consortium (LLMC), with additional journals from HathiTrust and the Internet Archive.

[7]We verify the completeness of our collection of legislative journals using Macdonald (1980).

Table 1: Roll Call Data: States and Legislative Sessions

State	During Reconstruction		After Reconstruction	
	Election Year	Legislative Sessions	Election Year	Legislative Sessions
Alabama	1870	1870 - 1871 1871 - 1872	1880	1880 - 1881
Arkansas	1870	1871	1880	1881
Florida	1870	1871 1872 1872 Special	1880	1881
Georgia	1870	1871 1872 Called 1872 Adjourned	1880	1880 1881 Adjourned
Louisiana			1879	1880 1881-1882 Extra
Mississippi	1871	1872 1873 (2 Vols.) 1873 Called	1879	1880
North Carolina	1870	1870 - 1871 1871 - 1872	1880	1881
South Carolina	1870	1870 - 1871 1871 - 1872	1880	1880 1881-1882 1882 Extra
Virginia	1871	1871 - 1872 1872 Special 1872 - 1873	1879	1879-1880

Note: All sessions are "regular" sessions unless otherwise noted.

dimensional analysis, ideal point estimation uses the roll call matrix to calculate a single value for each legislator that captures their revealed ideology.[8] Legislators with similar ideal point estimates should vote together more often than those with further apart ideal point estimates, and by combining the estimates with substantive knowledge about the political context in the

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[8]Ideal point estimates can be multi-dimensional, but we focus on single-dimensional models.

legislature we can qualitatively characterize the meaning of different scores.[9]

We estimate our specific ideal point estimates using the W-NOMINATE procedure developed by Poole and Rosenthal (2000), which we implement using the WNOMINATE package in R. For robustness checks, we also estimate the Bayesian Item Response Model suggested by Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004),[10] though the two types of ideal point estimates are highly correlated. We estimate one-dimension state legislator ideal point estimates for each state separately.[11] Fit and summary statistics for our ideal point models for each state are presented in Table A.2 in the Supplementary Materials.

State Legislator Party and Demographic Data

While ideal point estimation produces a low-dimensional summary of legislators' roll call records, it does so in a relatively abstract way: the values it produces are meaningless without substantive interpretation. To understand our ideal point estimates so we can use them in our analyses, we take advantage of additional legislator-specific information, specifically state legislators' races and their party identification. We assemble these data from a variety of primary and secondary sources, including legislative journals, newspapers, and state-assembled resources; for data on legislator race Foner (2014), also used by Logan (2018) and others, is a particularly valuable resource.

We first put these data to work to explore the cleavages that shape roll call dating in the legislative sessions in our data. To do so, we simply plot the distribution of ideal point estimates by legislators' races and party. This information is presented in Figure 1. As the figure

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[9]For example, in the modern U.S. Congress ideal point estimates for Republicans and Democrats are clearly different and the scores can be interpreted as capturing legislators' placements on a conservative-liberal ideological dimension.

[10]Implemented using the *ideal* function from the *pscl* package in *R*.

[11]The use of a single dimension is partially driven by convenience, as it simplifies local identification for the Bayesian IRT model. Substantively, however, we expect that in our historical state legislative context extracting meaningful information from higher dimensions would be difficult, and our main concern is with whether the primary cleavages of the day were shaped by Reconstruction intensity.

makes clear, nearly every Black legislator in our sample is a Republican. The plot also very clearly demonstrates that roll call voting in Reconstruction-era state legislators was significantly polarized along party lines, with the average Republican and Democrat voting in substantially different ways. Moreover, this figure provides some of the most comprehensive evidence to date on the preferences of Black elites during Reconstruction: as it shows, Black Republicans consistently demonstrate more extreme preferences than their white Republican counterparts, suggesting that Black legislators were, in some sense, more consistently "Republican" in their roll call voting. Because we have oriented all states such that higher scores are more in-line with Republicans and lower scores more in-line with Democrats, we feel comfortable proceeding to our regression analysis on the assumption that higher scores are more in-line with African Americans' preferences, at least on average.

Measuring Local-Level Intervention with Federal Troop Presence

We also require a measure of troop intensity at a given time and place. The data on troop occupation comes from Downs and Nesbit (2015) "Mapping Occupation" project, which draws on extensive primary source collection and aggregation to produce the most comprehensive portrait available of federal troop presence during Reconstruction. Using original US government reports and additional primary sources, they capture the location of union troop army posts as well as the number of troops in each Reconstruction state. Because this data is point-located and because state legislative districts were comprised of counties in this period, mapping troops to state legislative districts is relatively straightforward.[12]

Unfortunately, despite its impressive breadth, the data does not provide complete monthly accounting for troop presence – instead, it includes data when reports were available, leaving many gaps in a hypothetical place-by-time panel. To address this, we use linear imputation,

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[12]We map the point location to counties as of 1870, and then create districts based on those counties.

Figure 1: Distribution of Ideal Point Estimates by Race and Party

whereby we assume that troop counts in a location change linearly between reports.[13] We then average the monthly number of troops over the period from the start of the data (near the end of the Civil War) to the time period we consider. Once we calculate the average troop count, we

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[13]In Supplementary Materials Section C.2 we present our main results using results where we impute missing months with zeroes rather than linear imputation.

operationalize this value by calculating the per capita troop rate. This adjusts for the presence of troops relative to the population, accounting for the visibility of troops in a given county. To make results more interpretable at scale, we then adjust this measure from troops per capita to troops per thousand residents.

Additional Data

Finally, we incorporate a variety of variables from the U.S. Census. Most notably, we require a measure of district-level Black population share, but we also incorporate a variety of other variables explicitly for statistical control, which we describe in more detail below. We merge the census data to our legislators based on journals' descriptions of legislators' districts.[14]

Research Design

Our empirical strategy is relatively straightforward. Our unit of analysis is a state legislator and the dependent variable throughout is the ideal point estimate of that legislator's roll call records, as discussed in the previous section. As we explain, these scores have been oriented such that higher values are associated with more-Republican roll call records more in-line with African Americans' preferences, and lower scores are less so.

We test Hypotheses 1 and 2 by examining the relationship between state legislator ideology and the deployment of troops to protect Black voters. As discussed, we operationalize ideology using legislator ideal points *during reconstruction* (1870-1873 in our data). Recall that we are not just interested in the relationship between African American population and African-American-congruent roll call voting. Rather, Hypothesis 1 as applied to Reconstruction posits that the presence of federal troops in a district, by protecting the voting rights of the African

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[14]At present, we ignore the possible changes in county boundaries that may have occurred between the 1870 census and the start of our legislative session.

American population, allow Black preferences to be more fully expressed at the ballot box, and therefore in the legislature. Relatedly, Hypothesis 2 posits that this relationship increases in magnitude in direct proportion with the size of the Federal troop deployment. For this reason, we operationalize our independent variable by looking at the *interaction* between Black population share and the presence of federal troops in each legislator's home district.

Next, we test Hypothesis 3 by examining the relationship between state legislator ideology and the Black population share *after* Reconstruction in two sets of states: those that passed "Redemption" constitutions after the withdrawal of Federal troops (Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, and Louisiana) and those that still had their "Reconstruction"-era constitutions in place. As before, we measure ideology using ideal point estimates of legislator voting records. However, we now consider voting records after the Compromise of 1877 (1879-1882 in our data). Although the Fifteenth Amendment enshrining universal (male) manhood suffrage was legally the law of the land in both sets of states, the ratification of "Redemption" constitutions enabled a new legal framework around which to institutionalize majoritarian power in the former set of states. Thus, according to the logic we articulate in Hypothesis 3, we should expect a more robust relationship between Black populations and state legislator ideology in the states that had not yet passed new constitutions.

Finally, we test Hypothesis 4 by examining the relationship between state legislator ideology *after* Reconstruction and historical representation of Black political preferences. We operationalize the dependent variable using ideal point estimates of voting records *after* Reconstruction. We operationalize the independent variable using the interaction between Black population share and the presence of federal troops in each legislator's home district *during* Reconstruction. If intervention works according to the pathway outlined in Hypothesis 4, then the areas where Federal troops protected black voters during Reconstruction will have the strongest norms in favor of representative, multiracial democracy. These areas with troops should then elect legislators with ideologies that systematically differ from elected legislators in

areas that did not have troop protection during Reconstruction.

Because the nature of our research question and data limit our ability to exploit over-time variation, we rely on a straightforward selection-on-observables identification strategy. However, we acknowledge that selection concerns are important, given the inherently strategic nature of troop locations, including with respect to Black population.[15] To enhance the plausibility of a causal interpretation of our estimates, we incorporate an extensive battery of control variables drawn from the U.S. Census. Specifically, we include measures for the share of the population living in urban areas, the population density of the district, the land area of the district, and the mean value of farms in the district. Each of these might plausibly affect the likelihood of federal troops being stationed in a district as well as the voting behavior of a district's representatives.

With these independent and dependent variables in mind, our estimating equation takes on the following form:

$$WNOMINATE_{id} = \beta\, Black\ Share_d \times Troops_d + \psi\, Black\ Share_d + \gamma\, Troops_d + \boldsymbol{\phi}\mathbf{X}_d + \epsilon_{id} \quad (1)$$

where i indexes legislators and d indexes districts. Our primary quantity of interest is β, though ψ and γ are also potentially of interest. To conduct inference, we use Huber-White robust standard errors throughout our analyses.

Results: Troops Facilitate Black Representation

We begin our analysis by presenting our results graphically for a single, illustrative state. In Figure 2 we plot the relationship between the Black share of legislative district population and legislator ideal point estimates. We do this separately by whether a district had any troops

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[15]For example, the correlation between our (logged) measure of troop presence and Black population share is 0.31.

occupying it during Reconstruction, with the darker line representing the linear relationship for districts that were not occupied and the grey line indicating the relationship for those that were. This figure provides preliminary evidence for our expectations. While our subsequent regression models use continuous measures of troop presence, this figure helps to illustrate our main quantity of interest, as the interaction given by β in the equation above is the *difference* in the slopes of the two lines here. Because we find greater responsiveness in occupied districts this would constitute a positive interaction, and evidence that federal troop presence buoys responsiveness to African American interests.

Figure 2: Alabama 1871-1872: Roll Call Voting by District Racial Composition, Occupied and Unoccupied Districts

We next turn to our more-formal analysis. Our data enables us to conduct analysis across

the states in Reconstruction South. Given that ideal points are calculated state-by-state and are not directly comparable,[16] we estimate our results separately by state to provide substantively interpretable results. Table 2 shows the results of OLS models for each state in our data, using the specification given by Equation 1.

The coefficient on the covariate *Troops* is mixed in sign and significance. Where it is negative – as in Alabama and Arkansas – this indicates that the presence of union troops in a district that is entirely non-Black is correlated with more-Democratic roll call voting for those districts' legislators. This could suggest white backlash against occupation. The coefficient estimates for *Black Share*, on the other hand, are generally positive. Because these coefficient estimates reflect the relationship between Black population and roll call voting when our troop measure is 0, these estimates suggest that in most states African Americans were able to elect representatives who represented their interests during Reconstruction

Our main quantity of interest, shown in the first row of each panel of Table 2, is the interaction between federal troop and the proportion of the population that is Black. We hypothesized that union troops, by facilitating Black political participation, would facilitate the selection of legislators whose preferences aligned with African Americans'. In three states – Alabama, Arkansas, and North Carolina – we identify a positive and statistically significant interaction. In these states, as hypothesized, the level of union troops in districts with a higher proportion of African Americans correlates with an increased average ideal point of the legislator. Florida and Georgia also demonstrate a positive interaction, though the effect does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. We find virtually no relationship in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Virginia, and in South Carolina we actually find a *negative* relationship. While we cannot conclusively determine why this is the case, it strikes us as important that South Carolina has the highest statewide Black population share and, as we

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[16]Because of differing agendas, time periods, etc., there is no concrete way to establish that a -0.5 in one state, for example, reflects the same ideology as a -0.5 in another.

discuss below, a high share of legislators who are Republicans. Federal troops may have been unnecessary at this particular moment of Reconstruction due to a critical mass of statewide Black political power. We return to this point below. To ensure that our results are not sensitive to the particular method of ideal point scaling that we employ, we replicate Table 2 using, instead of W-NOMINATE scores, Bayesian IRT estimates. The results are substantively unchanged; see Table C.1 in the Supplementary Materials.

Table 2: Race, Troops, and State Legislative Roll Call Voting

	W-NOMINATE Score								
	AL	AR	FL	GA	LA	MS	NC	SC	VA
Black Share × Troops	0.064**	0.078**	0.016	0.015	−0.003	−0.006	0.038*	−0.204**	−0.001
	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.022)	(0.043)	(0.007)
Black Share	0.484*	1.467**	1.613**	0.087	1.145**	3.354**	1.478**	4.436**	0.970**
	(0.288)	(0.502)	(0.414)	(0.207)	(0.522)	(0.223)	(0.380)	(0.383)	(0.210)
Troops	−0.044**	−0.026**	−0.005	−0.003	0.003	0.002**	−0.010	0.139**	−0.000
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.038)	(0.001)
Urban Share	−0.317	−1.435*	0.825**	−0.524	0.250	0.288	0.481	−1.166**	−0.616
	(0.281)	(0.869)	(0.226)	(0.457)	(0.741)	(0.365)	(0.783)	(0.382)	(0.415)
Population Density	18.559**	−7.627	41.533**	−0.544	0.432	0.356	−8.506	16.130**	0.342
	(5.641)	(24.790)	(14.315)	(2.293)	(0.962)	(4.829)	(8.738)	(6.803)	(1.360)
Land Area	0.330*	0.199**	0.292**	0.292*	−0.036	0.017	−0.289	−0.138	−0.375*
	(0.189)	(0.094)	(0.083)	(0.160)	(0.090)	(0.126)	(0.281)	(0.085)	(0.207)
Mean Farm Value	0.101**	0.171	−0.109**	0.078**	0.013	−0.009	0.149*	−0.154**	−0.038**
	(0.049)	(0.282)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.079)	(0.077)	(0.017)
Constant	−1.241**	−1.043**	−1.171**	−0.342**	−0.590*	−1.818**	−0.537**	−2.482**	−0.224
	(0.179)	(0.432)	(0.211)	(0.116)	(0.330)	(0.190)	(0.258)	(0.269)	(0.140)
Observations	102	80	56	162	106	110	122	124	131
Adjusted R^2	0.568	0.439	0.554	0.068	0.142	0.675	0.259	0.497	0.236

Note: Entries are linear regression coefficients with Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. *Troops* is the mean of troops per thousand in a county, *Population Density* is in 1000s per sq. mile, *Land Area* is in 1,000s of sq. miles, and *Mean Farm Value* is in 1,000s of 1870 dollars. Observations are at the legislator level. **p<0.05, *p<0.10 (two-tailed).

Conducting our analysis separately by state, as we do in Table 2, offers two key strengths. First, it takes seriously the idea that ideal point estimates are not directly comparable when not included in the same scaling model; we cannot say for certain that a 0 in Alabama reflects the same ideology as a 0 in South Carolina, for example, and we are quite certain that they do not. Second, it allows the nuance of observing and attempting to interpret cross-state

differences, particularly given these states differing experiences with slavery, the Civil War, and Reconstruction. However, by estimating state-specific models, we are denied the satisfaction of drawing a single conclusion *vis à vis* our hypotheses. To wit, we estimate models, results for which are presented in Table B.1, combining all states together. Before doing so, we z-score the outcome within each state by subtracting from each legislator's score the mean of all scores and dividing by the standard deviation, such that scores can be interpreted as within-state standard deviations. When estimating our models, we also include state fixed effects. The results of these pooled models are shown in Table B.1. When pooling across the states in our sample, there is a significant positive relationship between Black population share and roll call voting, but no interaction effect between troops and Black population. Given the important differences in political and economic circumstances across states, as well as variation in the size and political power of their Black populations, we hesitate to over-interpret these results.

Mechanisms of Representation: Race and Party

Thus far we've demonstrated that troops present in a district can have a significant effect on the ideal points of the legislators in that state. We argue that this is due to the troops' ability to protect African American populations that overwhelmingly vote and support the Republican Party.[17] During Reconstruction, southern counties with federal troops were able to force legislators to acknowledge competing viewpoints in their districts and respond to constituents. To probe our mechanism further we use individual data on the party affiliation and race of each legislator to show how it can change the average ideal points of the state legislators. Figure 3 produces marginal effects plot for each state.

Each graph uses the base model in Panel C of Table 2 to show the main results of the troop and Black population share interaction effect. For the states where we find a positive interaction

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[17]We also acknowledge that as troops were themselves likely to be Republicans, they may also have sometimes coerced Black voters themselves.

above, adding in controls for legislator party and race diminishes the effect of federal troops.[18] In extreme cases (i.e. Alabama) the effect of union troops is completely erased when including race and party. In line with our hypothesis, these results demonstrate that the effect of federal troop presence is largely due to their ability to influence substantive legislative representation through facilitating the election of Republican and Black legislators.

In the Supplementary Materials we also present results using indicator variables for both "Black Legislator" and "Republican Legislator" as outcome variables. The patterns fairly closely match those seen in Table 2, though we find more-mixed results for troops facilitating the election of Republican legislators.

Reconstruction's Fleeting Effects

We next turn our attention to the period after Reconstruction. To do so, we perform a similar analysis to that above. We begin by noting important aggregate trends that should color any subsequent interpretation of these results. Specifically, nearly all southern states are almost immediately "redeemed" by White Democrats immediately following the withdrawal of federal troops (Perman 1984). This was achieved through a vicious combination of violence and fraud, including literal ballot-box stuffing and the intimidation and murder of Black and Republican voters and office-seekers. The consequence of this in southern legislatures was a dramatic increase in the proportion of seats held by Democrats. This is visualized in Figure 4, which plots the Democratic seat share in state lower chambers for both the earlier and later periods we consider (cataloged in Table 1 above). As this figure shows, there were nearly uniform increases in Democratic seat share from the period during to after Reconstruction; while more than half of the states we focus on featured a majority of non-Democrats during the Reconstruction session we focus on, no state had less than sixty-five percent Democrats in the post-Reconstruction

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[18]Mechanism testing through the addition of post-treatment covariates is known to rely on a strong "no intermediate confounders" assumption (Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen 2016).

Figure 3: Marginal Effect of Troop Presence Diminishes when Controlling for Race and Party

Figure presents point estimates and 95% confidence intervals (based on Huber-White standard errors) for a series of regression models. The base model for each state is analogous to those in Panel C of Table 2, with subsequent models adding controls for legislator's party affiliations, race, or both.

session on which we focus.

These well-documented aggregate consequences of Reconstruction, however, may mask

Figure 4: Democratic Seat Shares During and After Reconstruction, State Lower Chambers Party affiliation data from Dubin (2007). "During" and "After" years as defined in Table 1 above.

important variation within the South as a whole or individual southern states in the durability of Reconstruction's effects. In other words, the aggregate failure of Reconstruction to institute multi-racial democracy in the South does not preclude local variation in the persistence of Black political participation. Alternatively, it may be that the intensity of Reconstruction in different areas had no durable effects. Regardless, while Figure 4 and previous scholarship on Reconstruction clearly suggest the failure of Reconstruction as a national project, they do not necessarily inform us about the relative success of different mechanisms of statebuilding employed in Reconstruction.

The choice to focus on the post-Reconstruction period helps us evaluate the plausibility of

Hypothesis 4. By observing ideal points of Black Legislators in the period after federal troop depart from states we can conclude whether their presence had lasting and durable effects on the state legislators. If Reconstruction did in fact change the democratic and social norms of the states then the gains made during Reconstruction should maintain through the post-period. As we describe below, this was not the case. Secondly, after the departure of federal troops four states opted to adopt new constitutions that regressed to pre-reconstruction era policies. This variation in the post period for those states (Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, and Louisiana) allows us to observe the change in ideal points for states that did not instutitionalize democratic norms. Finally, the post period is the same collection of states without federal troops occupying counties. In this way, these results provide us with a placebo test to compare the reconstruction effects with non occupied counties.

To examine the durability of Reconstruction's effects at the local level, we employ an analogous approach to that above, exploring the relationship between previous troop presence and the legislative behavior of local areas' state legislative representatives. We begin by plotting the distribution of ideal point estimates by party and race for our post-Reconstruction period. These data are presented in Figure 5.

As the figure immediately conveys, the political situation is considerably more confused in the post-Reconstruction period than during. This is for a number of reasons. First, Democratic seat shares are so high that other parties are crowded out in some states almost entirely; in Alabama, for example, only a handful of legislators are anything but Democrats and all are white, so we are forced to pool Independents, a Republican, and a Greenbacker together to visualize the relationship; a similar issue exists in Mississippi, but there are a sufficient number of Black representatives to simply plot the data by race. Second, data availability is generally worse in this period; we were unable, for example, to find individual-level party affiliation data for Arkansas. Finally, in spite of Democratic dominance, a greater variety of parties divided the seats, including both Democrats and Republicans, but also Greenbackers, independents, and

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
Figure 5: Distribution of Ideal Point Estimates after Reconstruction (1880-1881)

in Virignia, Readjusters and regular Democrats within the Democratic Party.[19]

As a result of the small number of non-Democrats – especially Republicans – we first note that we must be more cautious in our interpretations of these ideal points with respect to Black preferences. While in the early period we can combine clear polarization between Democrats

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[19]In Figure 5 we combine Readjusters with Republicans due to their similar voting behavior.

and Republicans with historical knowledge that these parties reflected white supremacist and pro-civil rights positions, respectively, to clearly match the ideological spectrum to Black preferences, that is less clear in this later period. In Alabama, for example, while the distribution of Democrats and non-Democrats suggests different preferences, there is substantial overlap between the two and there are only five non-Democrats total. Additionally, the ability of Democrats to set the legislative agenda in this period may still result in polarization between the parties, but with little policymaking of direct interest to African Americans: that is, the parties may be polarized, but over issues of less direct concern to the African American community in this period. Finally, we must be cognizant that the Republican Party itself was a dynamic organization that, in at least some states, began to shift toward lily-whitism shortly after the end of Reconstruction (Heersink and Jenkins 2020).

In spite of these barriers, we do still note that for all of the states plotted in Figure 5 the distributions of ideal points suggest a better and worse end for African Americans; at the very least, all suggest clear differences across the distribution. To this end, we next re-do our analysis from Table 2 above, but with our late-period data. For this analysis, our data on federal troop presence is over the full period of Reconstruction, from 1865 to 1880 (or the beginning of the later-period session, whichever is earlier), and our demographic information is from the 1880 census. The analysis is otherwise comparable.

The results for the later period are presented in Table 3, and are broadly consistent with the failure of federal troop presence to institute norms of multi-racial democracy in the South. In eight out of the nine states, there is no significant interaction between our measure of troop presence and Black population share, and the effect sizes are substantively small. The only state with a significant effect size, Louisiana, shows a *negative* relationship. In Alabama and Arkansas – both states that previously featured a positive and significant interaction – the interactions are now considerably smaller and statistically insignificant. Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, and Virginia continue to feature no relationship between (former) troop presence

and state legislative roll call voting behavior. While we emphasize that, because our ideal point estimates for the two periods are estimated separately and are therefore not directly comparable, we cannot directly compare point estimates between Tables 2 and 3, the pattern produced is broadly consistent with a rapidly fading effect of troop presence.

Table 3: Race, Troops, and State Legislative Roll Call Voting: After Reconstruction

	W-NOMINATE Score								
	AL	AR	FL	GA	LA	MS	NC	SC	VA
Black Share × Troops	0.024	0.034	0.029	0.073	−0.203**	0.022	0.044	0.090	−0.013
	(0.043)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.054)	(0.050)	(0.019)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.027)
Black Share	−1.293**	0.785**	0.858	−0.603**	0.618	1.297**	1.192**	0.702**	−0.784*
	(0.222)	(0.291)	(0.554)	(0.269)	(0.377)	(0.285)	(0.348)	(0.341)	(0.412)
Troops	0.000	−0.004	−0.014	−0.024	0.109**	−0.003	−0.006	−0.012	−0.003
	(0.027)	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.003)	(0.020)	(0.053)	(0.004)
Urban Share	−1.415**	2.508**	0.263	−0.663**	0.426	1.150**	0.617	1.283**	−0.663
	(0.276)	(0.642)	(0.384)	(0.271)	(0.523)	(0.561)	(0.519)	(0.447)	(0.589)
Population Density	6.418	−10.952	21.829	−0.163	−0.658	−6.955	−3.600	−16.057**	−0.009
	(4.855)	(7.072)	(16.747)	(1.301)	(0.538)	(5.044)	(5.519)	(5.166)	(1.299)
Land Area	−0.301	−0.378	0.107**	−0.083	0.248**	−0.136	−0.661**	0.066	−0.247
	(0.217)	(0.248)	(0.053)	(0.257)	(0.076)	(0.197)	(0.288)	(0.084)	(0.327)
Mean Farm Value	0.227	0.112**	0.137**	−0.343**	0.227**	0.012	−0.125	0.202	−0.233**
	(0.200)	(0.054)	(0.064)	(0.162)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.178)	(0.162)	(0.068)
Constant	0.484**	−0.036	−1.239**	0.722**	−1.153**	−0.566**	0.009	−0.436*	1.225**
	(0.238)	(0.236)	(0.159)	(0.220)	(0.219)	(0.192)	(0.276)	(0.241)	(0.298)
Observations	100	89	75	110	90	119	116	122	86
Adjusted R^2	0.437	0.421	0.426	0.179	0.399	0.334	0.146	0.566	0.126

Note: Entries are linear regression coefficients with Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. *Troops* is the mean of troops per thousand in a county, *Population Density* is in 1000s per sq. mile, *Land Area* is in 1,000s of sq. miles, and *Mean Farm Value* is in 1,000s of 1870 dollars. Observations are at the legislator level. **p<0.05, *p<0.10 (two-tailed).

Finally, we note that our post-Reconstruction analysis captures a moment of flux in the Southern and national legal regimes around Black voting. At the national level, while the Fifteenth Amendment in principle protected Black voting rights, the evolution of northern voting behavior over the 1870s and the end of Reconstruction itself reflected a clear turn against the protection of Black voting rights in the (white) voting public. Second, while only Georgia had effectively disfranchised African Americans by the period we study, a number of states had begun the process of reneging on the fundamental law commitment to Black voting rights that

had been enshrined in the Reconstruction constitutitions: Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, and Louisiana adopted new constitutions in 1875, 1874, 1877, and 1879, respectively. While these new constitutions did not necessarily revoke manhood suffrage like later efforts beginning in the late 1880s would, they nevertheless began the process of white Democrats' chipping away at Reconstruction-era policies. While Louisiana has a negative effect, the almost uniform null results across the remaining states restrict our ability to draw strong conclusions about the effects of legal regimes (H3).

Conclusion

In this paper, we present rich new evidence on the nature of legislative politics and representation during Reconstruction in the American South. We bring to bear original roll call data from the lower chambers of state legislatures across the South, and combine this data with detailed legislator-specific race and party information. Using these data, we produce three findings of note. First, we present important new descriptive evidence about the distribution of state legislator preferences during Reconstruction. In particular, we show that Democrats and Republicans were meaningfully polarized, and that this inter-party cleavage was the primary dimension of legislative conflict in state legislatures during the peak of Reconstruction. We also demonstrate that Black legislators represented the most extreme wing of the Republican Party, consistently voting in a more consistent and extreme fashion than their White copartisans. This descriptive evidence constitutes some of the most comprehensive evidence to date on the preferences of Black elites during Reconstruction.

Our second primary finding is directly related to our hypotheses. We show that, in most states separately and in the aggregate, 1) greater Black population shares are associated with more-Republican roll call records, and 2) the presence of troops increases the responsiveness of legislators' roll call voting to Black population shares. This suggests that legislative politics

was broadly responsive to Black preferences during this period, but that this responsiveness was buttressed by the presence of federal troops, who qualitative accounts suggest acted as a kind of police force to protect the civil and political rights of African Americans. Finally, we find clear evidence that the increase in responsiveness we identify is a function not of within-party or within-racial group adaptation to representing a Black constituency with protected political rights, but is a function of selection. Specifically, we show that the marginal effect of troop presence on the relationship between Black population share and roll call voting is substantially diminished – usually to the point of statistical insignificance – by controlling for state representative race, party, or both. This suggests that the presence of federal troops facilitated the election of Republicans or African Americans by largely Black constituencies, who subsequently behaved differently in the legislature than counterfactual White Democrats would have. These results are consistent with prior work on Reconstruction, such as that by Logan (2018), which suggests the importance of Black descriptive representation for substantive policy outcomes during Reconstruction.

Our results have important implications for understanding Reconstruction and legislative politics in the United States more generally. As we note in the Introduction and discuss below, Reconstruction is a known and clear failure of statebuilding: thirty years after it ended, an effective apartheid state had been established across the states of the former Confederacy, characterized by social segregation, unequal access to state resources, and complete political disfranchisement for African Americans. Our results help capture the depth and steepness of the fall into the Jim Crow South by demonstrating the success of short-term statebuilding for facilitating representation of Black interests. We show that, for a brief moment when their political rights were protected by the bayonets of federal troops, African Americans elected Black and Republican representatives who cast legislative votes on their behalf, affording them representation that they lacked during the antebellum era and would regrettably lack again in decades time. Our results also offer new color to the study of representation in American

politics more generally. Though new research is beginning to challenge this assumption, most scholarship on representation in the United States all but assumes the existence of free and fair elections. Our research, by examining representation in a period when the use of force was required to ensure equal electoral participation, is uniquely positioned to speak to the relationship between free and fair elections and representation. The increased responsiveness that we identify as a function of federal troop presence should also be interpreted as diminished responsiveness in the *absence* of federal troops, highlighting the capacity for violence and fraud to diminish democratic governance and representation.

In addition, our findings have critical implications for research on statebuilding. First of all, we show how statebuilding is a process of a minority groups locking in gains in *de facto* power by shifting *de jure* power through the passing of legislation favoring minorities. Second, in contrast to existing research, we identify a new theoretical role for international actors. We focus on how international actors protect minority groups for a sufficiently long time for legislation to pass.

For this reason, we expect our results to have applicability beyond the case of Reconstruction. Although the scope of this study is limited to identity-based conflicts with foreign intervention, many of the same elements exist in other conflicts around the world. For example, the United States deployed hundreds of thousands of troops and spent billions of dollars to create states after civil wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Our findings suggest that statebuilding in these settings likely failed because the *de jure* power had not shifted sufficiently in favor of minority groups, thereby necissitating an extended and unsustainable U.S. occupation. Another example is UN peacekeeping operations, which have increasingly focused their mission mandates on protecting minority groups while power-sharing agreements are implemented.

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Appendix

Reconstruction and Representation

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Contents

A   Descriptive Statistics

A.1   Data Sources

Table A.1: Data Source Attribution

State	Year	Legislator Race Sources	Legislator Party Sources
Alabama	1870	Foner (1993); The Historical Marker Database 2023	The Independent Monitor (Tuscaloosa, AL), November 22, 1870; The Marion Commonwealth, December 5, 1872
Alabama	1880	Foner (1993)	The Marengo News (Demopolis, AL), August 26, 1880
Arkansas	1870	Foner (1993) Wintory (2006)	Daily Arkansas Gazette, November 19, 1870
Arkansas	1881	Foner (1993) Wintory (2006)	N/A
Florida	1871	Foner (1993)	The Weekly Floridian, December 27, 1870
Florida	1881	Foner (1993)	The Weekly Floridian, December 7, 1880
Georgia	1871	Foner (1993); The Daily Columbus Enquirer, January 1, 1871	The Georgia Weekly Telegraph, November 14, 1872; The Weekly Columbus Enquirer, December 12, 1871

Table A.1 – *continued from previous page*

State	Year	Legislator Race Sources	Legislator Party Sources
Georgia	1880	N/A	The Columbus Daily Enquirer, November 5, 1880; The Atlanta Constitution, November 3, 1880
Louisiana	1870	Foner (1993)	The New Orleans Republican, November 12, 1870
Louisiana	1880	Foner (1993)	The Shreveport Daily Standard, December 17, 1879; The Times Picayune, December 6, 1879
Mississippi	1872	Foner (1993)	The Natchez Democrat, November 21, 1871
Mississippi	1880	Foner (1993)	The Clarion-Ledger, November 12, 1879
North Carolina	1871	Foner (1993); The Daily Journal (Wilmington, NC), April 6, 1871 Balanoff (1972)	The Daily Journal (Wilmington, NC), April 6, 1871
North Carolina	1881	Foner (1993); The Greensboro North State, December 30, 1880	The Greensboro North State, December 30, 1880
South Carolina	1870	Foner (1993); Tindall (2003)	The Charleston Daily News, November 8, 1870
South Carolina	1880	Foner (1993); Tindall (2003)	The Orangeburg Democrat, November 19, 1880
Virginia	1872	Foner (1993); The Staunton Spectator, November 14, 1871	The Staunton Spectator, November 14, 1871
Virginia	1880	Foner (1993) Encyclopedia Virginia 2023	Provided by Jim Snyder

A.2 Roll Call Scaling Summary Statistics

Table A.2: W-NOMINATE Scaling Fit Statistics

State	Correct Classification	APRE	GMP	Scaled Votes	Scaled Legs.
Alabama	77.542	0.319	0.634	291	102
Arkansas	84.241	0.475	0.697	263	80
Florida	85.234	0.461	0.691	293	57
Georgia	81.263	0.299	0.677	69	162
Louisiana	82.882	0.405	0.672	220	100
Mississippi	88.011	0.662	0.761	556	117
North Carolina	87.085	0.577	0.734	647	122
South Carolina	78.214	0.283	0.639	426	124
Virginia	76.561	0.294	0.623	530	131

Table A.3: W-NOMINATE Scaling Fit Statistics: After Reconstruction

State	Correct Classification	APRE	GMP	Scaled Votes	Scaled Legs.
Alabama	81.490	0.174	0.669	290	100
Arkansas	76.590	0.164	0.604	212	91
Florida	82.677	0.286	0.669	219	76
Georgia	73.900	0.175	0.594	115	171
Louisiana	83.290	0.343	0.672	273	96
Mississippi	75.631	0.260	0.614	95	119
North Carolina	81.766	0.399	0.681	124	116
South Carolina	71.086	0.223	0.579	131	124
Virginia	90.230	0.715	0.797	236	95

A.3 Summary Statistics Tables

A.3.1 During Reconstruction

Table A.4: During-Reconstruction Summary Statistics: Alabama

Statistic	Min	Median	Max	Mean	St. Dev.	N
W-NOMINATE	−1.000	−0.363	1.000	−0.158	0.583	102
Bayesian IRT	−1.774	−0.366	2.176	−0.000	1.000	105
Black Legislator	0	0	1	0.168	0.376	101
Republican Legislator	0	0	1	0.356	0.481	101
Troops per Thousand (Zero-Imputation)	0.000	0.048	17.535	2.947	4.845	105
Troops per Thousand (Linear Imputation)	0.000	0.910	53.576	8.751	13.471	105
Black Pop. Share	0.005	0.516	0.802	0.491	0.246	105
Urban Pop. Share	0.000	0.000	0.650	0.065	0.150	105
Population Density (1000s/Sq. Mile)	0.004	0.026	0.055	0.026	0.012	105
Area (1000s of Sq. Miles)	0.559	0.795	1.634	0.833	0.212	105
Mean Farm Value (1000s of $s)	0.062	1.175	4.252	1.497	1.066	105

Note: Observations are at the legislator level.

Table A.5: During-Reconstruction Summary Statistics: Arkansas

Statistic	Min	Median	Max	Mean	St. Dev.	N
W-NOMINATE	−1.000	−0.240	1.000	−0.067	0.662	80
Bayesian IRT	−1.789	−0.174	1.918	0.000	1.000	84
Black Legislator	0	0	1	0.136	0.345	81
Republican Legislator	0	1	1	0.625	0.487	80
Troops per Thousand (Zero-Imputation)	0.000	1.670	33.272	6.444	9.184	84
Troops per Thousand (Linear Imputation)	0.000	8.178	56.073	12.564	14.791	84
Black Pop. Share	0.015	0.351	0.578	0.295	0.201	84
Urban Pop. Share	0.000	0.000	0.292	0.021	0.076	84
Population Density (1000s/Sq. Mile)	0.005	0.009	0.017	0.010	0.004	84
Area (1000s of Sq. Miles)	0.952	2.470	4.707	2.546	0.959	84
Mean Farm Value (1000s of $s)	0.313	0.825	1.545	0.863	0.285	84

Note: Observations are at the legislator level.

Table A.6: During-Reconstruction Summary Statistics: Florida

Statistic	Min	Median	Max	Mean	St. Dev.	N
W-NOMINATE	−1.000	0.526	1.000	0.150	0.742	57
Bayesian IRT	−2.243	0.465	1.283	−0.000	1.000	59
Black Legislator	0	0	1	0.220	0.418	59
Republican Legislator	0	0	1	0.458	0.502	59
Troops per Thousand (Zero-Imputation)	0.000	1.480	83.355	9.680	19.000	59
Troops per Thousand (Linear Imputation)	0.000	11.565	373.473	30.222	56.487	59
Black Pop. Share	0.016	0.404	0.810	0.421	0.238	59
Urban Pop. Share	0.000	0.000	0.887	0.056	0.177	59
Population Density (1000s/Sq. Mile)	0.00001	0.007	0.022	0.008	0.007	59
Area (1000s of Sq. Miles)	0.467	0.901	7.238	1.267	1.159	59
Mean Farm Value (1000s of $s)	0.110	0.922	6.416	1.224	1.510	58

Note: Observations are at the legislator level.

Table A.7: During-Reconstruction Summary Statistics: Georgia

Statistic	Min	Median	Max	Mean	St. Dev.	N
W-NOMINATE	−1.000	−0.154	1.000	−0.071	0.443	162
Bayesian IRT	−2.691	−0.158	2.882	0.000	1.000	171
Black Legislator	0	0	1	0.082	0.275	171
Republican Legislator	0	0	1	0.175	0.381	171
Troops per Thousand (Zero-Imputation)	0.000	0.106	29.147	1.704	4.187	171
Troops per Thousand (Linear Imputation)	0.000	2.454	180.646	6.876	18.191	171
Black Pop. Share	0.018	0.496	0.818	0.438	0.214	171
Urban Pop. Share	0.000	0.000	0.684	0.060	0.169	171
Population Density (1000s/Sq. Mile)	0.002	0.025	0.186	0.030	0.028	171
Area (1000s of Sq. Miles)	0.139	0.422	1.229	0.455	0.223	171
Mean Farm Value (1000s of $s)	0.219	1.584	7.871	1.676	1.197	171

Note: Observations are at the legislator level.

Table A.8: During-Reconstruction Summary Statistics: Louisiana

Statistic	Min	Median	Max	Mean	St. Dev.	N
W-NOMINATE	−1.000	0.345	1.000	0.204	0.537	107
Bayesian IRT	−2.476	−0.287	3.164	−0.031	0.972	111
Black Legislator	0	0	1	0.333	0.474	111
Republican Legislator	0	1	1	0.880	0.327	100
Troops per Thousand (Zero-Imputation)	0.000	3.410	44.750	5.778	8.336	110
Troops per Thousand (Linear Imputation)	0.000	7.941	235.398	18.164	33.257	110
Black Pop. Share	0.183	0.536	0.928	0.519	0.201	110
Urban Pop. Share	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.233	0.412	110
Population Density (1000s/Sq. Mile)	0.001	0.019	0.792	0.187	0.322	110
Area (1000s of Sq. Miles)	0.204	0.646	3.685	0.791	0.652	110
Mean Farm Value (1000s of $s)	0.189	4.694	23.553	5.404	5.589	110

Note: Observations are at the legislator level.

Table A.9: During-Reconstruction Summary Statistics: Mississippi

Statistic	Min	Median	Max	Mean	St. Dev.	N
W-NOMINATE	−1.000	0.191	1.000	0.053	0.723	113
Bayesian IRT	−1.522	0.195	2.189	−0.003	1.007	114
Black Legislator	0	0	1	0.325	0.470	114
Republican Legislator	0	1	1	0.577	0.496	111
Troops per Thousand (Zero-Imputation)	0.000	0.477	18.985	2.994	5.141	111
Troops per Thousand (Linear Imputation)	0.000	9.127	494.506	15.626	47.430	111
Black Pop. Share	0.101	0.561	0.892	0.560	0.188	111
Urban Pop. Share	0.000	0.000	0.475	0.050	0.127	111
Population Density (1000s/Sq. Mile)	0.003	0.023	0.049	0.024	0.011	111
Area (1000s of Sq. Miles)	0.401	0.727	2.593	0.765	0.266	111
Mean Farm Value (1000s of $s)	0.207	1.139	23.538	2.121	3.855	111

Note: Observations are at the legislator level.

Table A.10: During-Reconstruction Summary Statistics: North Carolina

Statistic	Min	Median	Max	Mean	St. Dev.	N
W-NOMINATE	−1.000	−0.590	1.000	−0.158	0.696	122
Bayesian IRT	−1.302	−0.527	3.776	−0.003	1.003	127
Black Legislator	0	0	1	0.159	0.367	126
Republican Legislator	0	0	1	0.357	0.481	126
Troops per Thousand (Zero-Imputation)	0.000	0.000	24.348	3.341	6.421	127
Troops per Thousand (Linear Imputation)	0.000	0.000	185.899	12.370	27.010	127
Black Pop. Share	0.037	0.394	0.703	0.368	0.182	127
Urban Pop. Share	0.000	0.000	0.481	0.036	0.106	127
Population Density (1000s/Sq. Mile)	0.008	0.024	0.044	0.025	0.009	127
Area (1000s of Sq. Miles)	0.173	0.557	1.148	0.603	0.236	127
Mean Farm Value (1000s of $s)	0.218	0.870	5.073	1.057	0.838	127

Note: Observations are at the legislator level.

Table A.11: During-Reconstruction Summary Statistics: South Carolina

Statistic	Min	Median	Max	Mean	St. Dev.	N
W-NOMINATE	−1.000	0.307	1.000	0.148	0.582	124
Bayesian IRT	−2.986	0.285	1.533	−0.000	1.000	126
Black Legislator	0	1	1	0.571	0.497	126
Republican Legislator	0	1	1	0.824	0.383	119
Troops per Thousand (Zero-Imputation)	0.041	2.001	15.636	3.751	4.381	126
Troops per Thousand (Linear Imputation)	1.456	4.946	39.538	9.873	9.700	126
Black Pop. Share	0.230	0.649	0.845	0.596	0.145	126
Urban Pop. Share	0.000	0.000	0.551	0.100	0.204	126
Population Density (1000s/Sq. Mile)	0.009	0.026	0.042	0.026	0.010	126
Area (1000s of Sq. Miles)	0.485	1.017	2.105	1.235	0.552	126
Mean Farm Value (1000s of $s)	0.086	1.035	3.110	1.055	0.593	126

Note: Observations are at the legislator level.

Table A.12: During-Reconstruction Summary Statistics: Virginia

Statistic	Min	Median	Max	Mean	St. Dev.	N
W-NOMINATE	−1.000	−0.275	1.000	−0.183	0.521	131
Bayesian IRT	−1.944	−0.237	2.502	−0.000	1.000	131
Black Legislator	0	0	1	0.115	0.320	131
Republican Legislator	0	0	1	0.237	0.427	131
Troops per Thousand (Zero-Imputation)	0.000	0.392	73.628	4.575	11.245	131
Troops per Thousand (Linear Imputation)	0.000	3.332	305.651	20.704	46.423	131
Black Pop. Share	0.012	0.469	0.759	0.415	0.186	131
Urban Pop. Share	0.000	0.000	0.810	0.113	0.237	131
Population Density (1000s/Sq. Mile)	0.006	0.031	0.525	0.053	0.078	131
Area (1000s of Sq. Miles)	0.032	0.452	1.022	0.461	0.218	131
Mean Farm Value (1000s of $s)	0.297	2.663	10.538	3.418	2.226	131

Note: Observations are at the legislator level.

A.3.2 After Reconstruction

Table A.13: Post-Reconstruction Summary Statistics: Alabama

Statistic	Min	Median	Max	Mean	St. Dev.	N
W-NOMINATE	−1.000	−0.092	1.000	−0.072	0.494	100
Bayesian IRT	−1.978	−0.021	4.949	0.000	1.000	101
Black Legislator	0	0	0	0.000	0.000	101
Troops per Thousand (Zero-Imputation)	0.000	0.003	6.970	0.969	1.900	100
Troops per Thousand (Linear Imputation)	0.000	0.183	22.517	3.084	5.271	100
Black Pop. Share	0.004	0.456	0.828	0.463	0.249	100
Urban Pop. Share	0.000	0.000	0.599	0.060	0.145	100
Population Density (1000s/Sq. Mile)	0.004	0.028	0.065	0.030	0.014	100
Area (1000s of Sq. Miles)	0.537	0.778	1.634	0.815	0.219	100
Mean Farm Value (1000s of $s)	0.261	0.588	1.312	0.607	0.198	100

Note: Observations are at the legislator level.

Table A.14: Post-Reconstruction Summary Statistics: Arkansas

Statistic	Min	Median	Max	Mean	St. Dev.	N
W-NOMINATE	−1.000	−0.160	1.000	−0.078	0.578	91
Bayesian IRT	−1.810	−0.215	2.906	0.000	1.000	93
Black Legislator	0	0	1	0.043	0.204	93
Troops per Thousand (Zero-Imputation)	0.000	0.000	20.736	1.594	3.842	91
Troops per Thousand (Linear Imputation)	0.000	0.000	53.324	3.416	7.457	91
Black Pop. Share	0.001	0.251	0.840	0.277	0.253	91
Urban Pop. Share	0.000	0.000	0.403	0.040	0.103	91
Population Density (1000s/Sq. Mile)	0.003	0.015	0.042	0.017	0.008	91
Area (1000s of Sq. Miles)	0.000	0.713	1.166	0.734	0.184	93
Mean Farm Value (1000s of $s)	0.374	0.724	5.740	0.875	0.616	91

Note: Observations are at the legislator level.

Table A.15: Post-Reconstruction Summary Statistics: Florida

Statistic	Min	Median	Max	Mean	St. Dev.	N
W-NOMINATE	−1.000	−0.578	1.000	−0.337	0.618	76
Bayesian IRT	−0.980	−0.350	3.139	0.000	1.000	76
Black Legislator	0	0	0	0.000	0.000	76
Troops per Thousand (Zero-Imputation)	0.000	0.478	27.560	3.693	7.193	76
Troops per Thousand (Linear Imputation)	0.000	5.941	151.308	11.721	19.846	76
Black Pop. Share	0.038	0.419	0.856	0.426	0.234	76
Urban Pop. Share	0.000	0.000	0.904	0.077	0.202	76
Population Density (1000s/Sq. Mile)	0.00004	0.010	0.028	0.011	0.009	76
Area (1000s of Sq. Miles)	0.467	0.868	6.417	1.269	1.141	76
Mean Farm Value (1000s of $s)	0.160	0.622	3.634	0.920	0.841	75

Note: Observations are at the legislator level.

Table A.16: Post-Reconstruction Summary Statistics: Georgia

Statistic	Min	Median	Max	Mean	St. Dev.	N
W-NOMINATE	−1.000	0.106	1.000	0.083	0.454	171
Bayesian IRT	−2.303	0.006	3.302	0.000	1.000	177
Black Legislator	0	0	0	0.000	0.000	177
Troops per Thousand (Zero-Imputation)	0.007	0.107	10.679	0.966	1.969	114
Troops per Thousand (Linear Imputation)	0.452	1.754	60.384	4.124	7.910	114
Black Pop. Share	0.015	0.505	0.845	0.454	0.216	170
Urban Pop. Share	0.000	0.000	0.761	0.068	0.183	170
Population Density (1000s/Sq. Mile)	0.003	0.033	0.273	0.039	0.038	170
Area (1000s of Sq. Miles)	0.121	0.395	1.164	0.435	0.219	170
Mean Farm Value (1000s of $s)	0.304	0.833	1.578	0.842	0.274	170

Note: Observations are at the legislator level.

Table A.17: Post-Reconstruction Summary Statistics: Louisiana

Statistic	Min	Median	Max	Mean	St. Dev.	N
W-NOMINATE	−1.000	−0.363	1.000	−0.212	0.579	96
Bayesian IRT	−1.766	−0.245	2.452	−0.000	1.000	96
Black Legislator	0	0	1	0.073	0.261	96
Troops per Thousand (Zero-Imputation)	0.000	0.808	20.054	2.021	3.462	90
Troops per Thousand (Linear Imputation)	0.000	4.160	107.708	6.897	13.732	90
Black Pop. Share	0.073	0.505	0.914	0.505	0.205	90
Urban Pop. Share	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.210	0.390	90
Population Density (1000s/Sq. Mile)	0.002	0.023	1.091	0.223	0.421	90
Area (1000s of Sq. Miles)	0.198	0.638	3.685	0.744	0.599	90
Mean Farm Value (1000s of $s)	0.210	1.406	7.812	2.163	1.802	90

Note: Observations are at the legislator level.

Table A.18: Post-Reconstruction Summary Statistics: Mississippi

Statistic	Min	Median	Max	Mean	St. Dev.	N
W-NOMINATE	−1.000	−0.025	1.000	−0.023	0.518	119
Bayesian IRT	−2.597	−0.039	3.427	0.000	1.000	120
Black Legislator	0	0	1	0.058	0.235	120
Troops per Thousand (Zero-Imputation)	0.000	0.155	14.374	1.163	2.277	120
Troops per Thousand (Linear Imputation)	0.000	3.083	236.214	7.399	22.440	120
Black Pop. Share	0.094	0.613	0.917	0.568	0.205	120
Urban Pop. Share	0.000	0.000	0.378	0.033	0.089	120
Population Density (1000s/Sq. Mile)	0.003	0.031	0.055	0.030	0.013	120
Area (1000s of Sq. Miles)	0.401	0.678	1.462	0.678	0.203	120
Mean Farm Value (1000s of $s)	0.284	0.791	13.748	1.308	1.765	120

Note: Observations are at the legislator level.

Table A.19: Post-Reconstruction Summary Statistics: North Carolina

Statistic	Min	Median	Max	Mean	St. Dev.	N
W-NOMINATE	−1.000	−0.341	1.000	−0.093	0.612	116
Bayesian IRT	−2.407	−0.352	2.333	−0.000	1.000	119
Black Legislator	0	0	1	0.050	0.220	119
Troops per Thousand (Zero-Imputation)	0.000	0.000	8.083	1.134	2.187	119
Troops per Thousand (Linear Imputation)	0.000	0.000	75.836	4.662	11.464	119
Black Pop. Share	0.029	0.382	0.718	0.358	0.189	119
Urban Pop. Share	0.000	0.000	0.812	0.039	0.122	119
Population Density (1000s/Sq. Mile)	0.007	0.029	0.105	0.032	0.015	119
Area (1000s of Sq. Miles)	0.173	0.546	1.092	0.569	0.219	119
Mean Farm Value (1000s of $s)	0.452	0.849	1.949	0.877	0.294	119

Note: Observations are at the legislator level.

Table A.20: Post-Reconstruction Summary Statistics: South Carolina

Statistic	Min	Median	Max	Mean	St. Dev.	N
W-NOMINATE	−1.000	−0.047	1.000	−0.054	0.518	124
Bayesian IRT	−3.001	0.077	2.001	−0.000	1.000	127
Black Legislator	0	0	1	0.073	0.260	124
Troops per Thousand (Zero-Imputation)	0.011	0.869	9.182	1.396	2.009	125
Troops per Thousand (Linear Imputation)	0.496	1.978	14.527	3.774	3.430	125
Black Pop. Share	0.258	0.652	0.919	0.607	0.137	125
Urban Pop. Share	0.000	0.000	0.486	0.092	0.174	125
Population Density (1000s/Sq. Mile)	0.014	0.039	0.049	0.036	0.010	125
Area (1000s of Sq. Miles)	0.485	0.932	2.105	1.095	0.490	125
Mean Farm Value (1000s of $s)	0.338	0.684	1.537	0.742	0.223	125

Note: Observations are at the legislator level.

Table A.21: Post-Reconstruction Summary Statistics: Virginia

Statistic	Min	Median	Max	Mean	St. Dev.	N
W-NOMINATE	−1.000	0.736	1.000	0.214	0.754	95
Bayesian IRT	−1.917	0.489	1.327	−0.000	1.000	97
Black Legislator	0	0	1	0.103	0.306	97
Troops per Thousand (Zero-Imputation)	0.000	0.153	28.237	1.418	4.594	88
Troops per Thousand (Linear Imputation)	0.000	1.276	162.912	7.283	19.496	88
Black Pop. Share	0.010	0.460	0.719	0.410	0.191	88
Urban Pop. Share	0.000	0.000	0.778	0.069	0.166	88
Population Density (1000s/Sq. Mile)	0.011	0.035	0.550	0.047	0.063	88
Area (1000s of Sq. Miles)	0.000	0.477	1.405	0.499	0.279	97
Mean Farm Value (1000s of $s)	0.515	1.526	5.177	1.921	1.041	88

Note: Observations are at the legislator level.

B Additional Results

Table B.1: Combined Models: Race, Troops, and State Legislative Roll Call Voting

	W-NOMINATE Score (Z-Score)	
Black Share × Troops (Linearly Imputed)	0.000	
	(0.004)	
Black Share × Troops (Zero-Imputed)		0.027
		(0.023)
Black Share	2.473**	2.380**
	(0.165)	(0.164)
Troops (Linearly Imputed)	−0.000	
	(0.001)	
Troops (Zero-Imputed)		−0.007
		(0.012)
Urban Share	−0.637**	−0.775**
	(0.236)	(0.249)
Population Density	2.206**	2.387**
	(0.432)	(0.443)
Land Area	0.099	0.104
	(0.066)	(0.067)
Mean Farm Value	0.011	0.012
	(0.010)	(0.010)
Constant	−1.338**	−1.313**
	(0.115)	(0.117)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Observations	993	993
Adjusted R^2	0.226	0.228

Note: Entries are linear regression coefficients with Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. *Troops* is the mean of troops per thousand in a county over the course of Reconstruction, *Population Density* is in 1000s per sq. mile, *Land Area* is in 1,000s of sq. miles, and *Mean Farm Value* is in 1,000s of 1870 dollars. Observations are at the legislator level. **p<0.05, *p<0.10 (two-tailed).

Table B.2: Race, Troops, and Descriptive and Partisan Representation

	AL	AR	FL	GA	LA	MS	NC	SC	VA
Panel A: Outcome: African-American Representative (0-1)									
Black Share × Troops	0.035**	−0.000	0.013*	0.011	0.013	0.005	0.032**	−0.083**	0.004
	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.018)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.041)	(0.006)
Black Share	−0.344**	0.744**	−0.271	0.282**	0.207	1.210**	0.735**	2.869**	0.567**
	(0.169)	(0.317)	(0.202)	(0.115)	(0.347)	(0.275)	(0.217)	(0.327)	(0.149)
Troops	−0.021**	−0.004	−0.005*	−0.003	−0.003	0.000	−0.010**	0.056*	−0.001
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.033)	(0.001)
Urban Share	−0.244	−0.744**	0.576**	−0.166	0.048	0.203	−0.609*	−0.248	0.224
	(0.186)	(0.363)	(0.285)	(0.276)	(0.818)	(0.464)	(0.323)	(0.366)	(0.267)
Population Density	7.923	6.614	23.656	0.090	0.507	−0.693	−2.126	3.273	−1.040*
	(5.679)	(11.221)	(15.657)	(1.475)	(1.076)	(5.108)	(3.835)	(5.122)	(0.574)
Land Area	0.187	0.079*	0.000	0.124	0.067	0.032	0.073	−0.059	−0.275**
	(0.148)	(0.048)	(0.033)	(0.124)	(0.070)	(0.096)	(0.143)	(0.105)	(0.131)
Mean Farm Value	0.207**	0.247	0.085**	0.002	0.019**	0.011	0.055	−0.141**	−0.017
	(0.052)	(0.207)	(0.041)	(0.021)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.039)	(0.065)	(0.011)
Constant	−0.306**	−0.496**	−0.007	−0.102	−0.112	−0.421**	−0.180	−0.967**	0.082
	(0.148)	(0.247)	(0.095)	(0.077)	(0.202)	(0.141)	(0.123)	(0.214)	(0.075)
Observations	101	81	58	171	110	111	126	126	131
Adjusted R^2	0.431	0.233	0.471	0.053	0.131	0.283	0.299	0.289	0.162
Panel B: Outcome: Republican Representative (0-1)									
Black Share × Troops	0.043**	0.018	−0.002	0.007	−0.014**	−0.010*	0.043**	−0.094**	0.002
	(0.013)	(0.028)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.019)	(0.005)
Black Share	0.166	1.013**	−0.059	0.425**	1.282**	2.309**	0.876**	2.949**	1.012**
	(0.287)	(0.433)	(0.361)	(0.167)	(0.298)	(0.157)	(0.265)	(0.198)	(0.189)
Troops	−0.024**	−0.007	−0.000	−0.002	0.009**	0.002**	−0.013**	0.065**	−0.000
	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.016)	(0.001)
Urban Share	−0.750**	−1.777**	0.662**	−0.424	0.440**	0.129	0.207	−0.839**	−0.294
	(0.263)	(0.570)	(0.193)	(0.363)	(0.183)	(0.223)	(0.495)	(0.161)	(0.290)
Population Density	11.617**	−33.691	56.891**	0.972	0.243	4.283	−4.023	16.996**	0.777
	(5.500)	(24.246)	(9.244)	(1.860)	(0.235)	(3.692)	(5.929)	(3.088)	(1.065)
Land Area	0.209	−0.024	0.050	0.162	0.054	0.102	−0.046	0.048	0.009
	(0.191)	(0.063)	(0.041)	(0.151)	(0.069)	(0.102)	(0.215)	(0.032)	(0.177)
Mean Farm Value	0.176**	0.165	−0.014	0.057*	0.010**	−0.011**	0.049	−0.076**	−0.042**
	(0.047)	(0.259)	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.044)	(0.025)	(0.014)
Constant	−0.412**	0.635*	−0.067	−0.187*	−0.071	−0.806**	0.052	−1.288**	−0.068
	(0.181)	(0.331)	(0.151)	(0.104)	(0.228)	(0.153)	(0.202)	(0.131)	(0.127)
Observations	101	80	58	171	99	108	126	119	131
Adjusted R^2	0.542	0.401	0.476	0.127	0.338	0.636	0.284	0.771	0.241

Note: Entries are linear regression coefficients with Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. Observations are at the legislator level. **p<0.05, *p<0.10 (two-tailed).

C Robustness Checks

C.1 BIRT Outcome Measure

In the text we present results using W-NOMINATE ideal point estimates; in this section, we demonsrate that our results are broadly consistent if we instead use Bayesian IRT ideal point estimates, which rely on different functional form assumptions and are estimated using a Bayesian estimation procedure, whereas W-NOMINATE uses a quasi-maximum likelihood procedure. Across all of our state-time periods, the lowest correlation between the two measures is 0.93 , suggesting that these measures are clearly capturing the same underlying distribution of legislators' ideological behaviors.

Table C.1: IRT Ideal Point Estimates: During Reconstruction

	IRT Score								
	AL	AR	FL	GA	LA	MS	NC	SC	VA
Black Share × Troops	0.093**	0.082**	0.018	0.026	−0.008	−0.009	0.035	−0.325**	−0.001
	(0.038)	(0.034)	(0.017)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.011)	(0.029)	(0.071)	(0.013)
Black Share	0.648	2.649**	2.283**	0.283	−1.669*	4.285**	2.309**	7.413**	2.054**
	(0.557)	(0.744)	(0.588)	(0.445)	(0.911)	(0.329)	(0.558)	(0.760)	(0.408)
Troops	−0.060**	−0.026*	−0.006	−0.006	0.001	0.003**	−0.010	0.222**	−0.001
	(0.025)	(0.014)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.001)	(0.009)	(0.061)	(0.002)
Urban Share	−0.949*	−2.375*	0.685	−1.108	−0.188	0.586	0.658	−2.025**	−0.898
	(0.519)	(1.243)	(0.500)	(1.021)	(1.249)	(0.582)	(1.076)	(0.643)	(0.764)
Population Density	29.888**	−2.861	36.172*	0.681	−1.026	−1.150	−9.384	30.862**	0.177
	(10.545)	(37.416)	(19.826)	(5.460)	(1.635)	(7.175)	(11.133)	(11.787)	(2.455)
Land Area	0.635	0.316**	0.402**	0.542	0.048	−0.069	−0.166	−0.159	−0.829**
	(0.395)	(0.141)	(0.105)	(0.363)	(0.139)	(0.197)	(0.377)	(0.131)	(0.394)
Mean Farm Value	0.174**	0.213	−0.077	0.146*	−0.036*	−0.010	0.167	−0.291**	−0.068**
	(0.080)	(0.452)	(0.065)	(0.082)	(0.019)	(0.009)	(0.111)	(0.113)	(0.032)
Constant	−1.774**	−1.708**	−1.736**	−0.602**	1.287**	−2.284**	−0.774**	−4.520**	−0.126
	(0.324)	(0.620)	(0.287)	(0.261)	(0.594)	(0.352)	(0.350)	(0.511)	(0.257)
Observations	105	84	58	171	110	111	127	126	131
Adjusted R^2	0.432	0.432	0.427	0.040	0.151	0.564	0.263	0.499	0.249

Note: Entries are linear regression coefficients with Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. *Troops* is the mean of troops per thousand in a county, *Population Density* is in 1000s per sq. mile, *Land Area* is in 1,000s of sq. miles, and *Mean Farm Value* is in 1,000s of 1870 dollars. Observations are at the legislator level. **p<0.05, *p<0.10 (two-tailed).

Table C.2: IRT Ideal Point Estimates: After Reconstruction

	IRT Score								
	AL	AR	FL	GA	LA	MS	NC	SC	VA
Black Share × Troops	0.003	0.035	0.024	0.134	−0.337**	0.034	0.080	0.010	−0.011
	(0.062)	(0.057)	(0.052)	(0.087)	(0.080)	(0.036)	(0.090)	(0.113)	(0.027)
Black Share	−1.999**	0.872	1.097	−0.860	0.790	2.173**	1.812**	−1.112*	−1.017*
	(0.363)	(0.531)	(0.865)	(0.604)	(0.611)	(0.561)	(0.549)	(0.596)	(0.542)
Troops	0.022	−0.001	−0.014	−0.042	0.181**	−0.005	−0.012	−0.088	−0.004
	(0.039)	(0.007)	(0.018)	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.005)	(0.029)	(0.098)	(0.004)
Urban Share	−2.494**	5.333**	0.307	−1.272**	0.718	2.583*	1.477*	−2.600**	−0.956
	(0.578)	(1.497)	(0.601)	(0.526)	(0.898)	(1.345)	(0.896)	(0.767)	(0.742)
Population Density	9.383	−22.757	50.533*	−0.174	−1.246	−7.360	−7.776	25.789**	0.214
	(8.587)	(14.118)	(28.074)	(2.479)	(0.912)	(10.058)	(9.014)	(8.093)	(1.472)
Land Area	−0.484	−0.583	0.177**	−0.273	0.389**	−0.373	−0.925*	−0.364**	−0.245
	(0.433)	(0.448)	(0.084)	(0.569)	(0.123)	(0.388)	(0.491)	(0.151)	(0.385)
Mean Farm Value	0.288	0.226**	0.212**	−0.938**	0.412**	0.020	−0.126	−0.296	−0.338**
	(0.391)	(0.098)	(0.095)	(0.378)	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.276)	(0.259)	(0.090)
Constant	0.890**	0.169	−1.464**	1.354**	−1.471**	−0.952**	0.093	0.919**	1.328**
	(0.437)	(0.404)	(0.275)	(0.551)	(0.359)	(0.385)	(0.445)	(0.414)	(0.385)
Observations	100	91	75	114	90	120	119	125	88
Adjusted R^2	0.377	0.353	0.414	0.142	0.419	0.301	0.155	0.546	0.128

Note: Entries are linear regression coefficients with Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. *Troops* is the mean of troops per thousand in a county, *Population Density* is in 1000s per sq. mile, *Land Area* is in 1,000s of sq. miles, and *Mean Farm Value* is in 1,000s of 1870 dollars. Observations are at the legislator level. **p<0.05, *p<0.10 (two-tailed).

C.2 Alternative Troop Measure

Tables C.3 and C.4 replicate Table 2 and 3, respectively, from the main text using an alternative measure of federal troop presence. Our in-text measure of troop presence linearly interpolates troop numbers over time for the full set of unique places included in Downs and Nesbit's (2015) data, and then identifies these locations' counties and aggregates to the county level. In Table C.3 and C.4, we instead assume that if Downs and Nesbit (2015) do not identify troop numbers for a given location-month, there were none; in other words, we fill in the missing data with zeroes. While we strongly suspect this is a less accurate approximation of troop levels, it is a conservative test insofar as it relies only on the extant data. Our results are broadly similar to those presented in the text, though the late-period analysis is perhaps somewhat more bullish for the prospect of Black representation.

Table C.3: Alternative Troop Measure: During Reconstruction

	W-NOMINATE Score								
	AL	AR	FL	GA	LA	MS	NC	SC	VA
Black Share × Troops	0.096**	0.053	0.040*	0.081	−0.171	−0.013	0.236**	−0.402**	0.047**
	(0.042)	(0.046)	(0.021)	(0.072)	(0.137)	(0.050)	(0.075)	(0.078)	(0.023)
Black Share	0.546*	2.042**	1.673**	0.093	1.383**	3.178**	1.340**	4.084**	0.852**
	(0.301)	(0.440)	(0.393)	(0.204)	(0.429)	(0.206)	(0.401)	(0.478)	(0.209)
Troops	−0.078**	−0.006	−0.012*	−0.027	0.106	0.031	−0.083**	0.255**	−0.025*
	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.006)	(0.024)	(0.080)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.065)	(0.014)
Urban Share	0.018	−2.314**	0.764**	−0.585	1.022	−0.520	−0.376	−0.807*	−0.498
	(0.296)	(0.853)	(0.215)	(0.514)	(1.385)	(0.419)	(0.914)	(0.476)	(0.427)
Population Density	18.486**	3.808	43.152**	−0.802	−0.994	0.904	−8.820	12.987*	0.229
	(7.894)	(26.243)	(14.222)	(2.266)	(2.009)	(4.846)	(9.090)	(7.397)	(1.359)
Land Area	0.409*	0.241**	0.301**	0.285*	−0.054	−0.005	−0.346	−0.168*	−0.358*
	(0.246)	(0.092)	(0.085)	(0.160)	(0.080)	(0.120)	(0.285)	(0.101)	(0.198)
Mean Farm Value	0.104**	−0.010	−0.104**	0.076**	0.014	−0.004	0.191**	−0.185**	−0.036**
	(0.051)	(0.300)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.083)	(0.090)	(0.016)
Constant	−1.340**	−1.346**	−1.229**	−0.327**	−0.675**	−1.762**	−0.483*	−2.063**	−0.193
	(0.242)	(0.405)	(0.195)	(0.116)	(0.276)	(0.184)	(0.254)	(0.253)	(0.136)
Observations	102	80	56	162	106	110	122	124	131
Adjusted R^2	0.549	0.419	0.557	0.064	0.154	0.673	0.287	0.476	0.253

Note: Entries are zero regression coefficients with Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. *Troops* is the mean of troops per thousand in a county, *Population Density* is in 1000s per sq. mile, *Land Area* is in 1,000s of sq. miles, and *Mean Farm Value* is in 1,000s of 1870 dollars. Observations are at the legislator level. **p<0.05, *p<0.10 (two-tailed).

Table C.4: Alternative Troop Measure: After Reconstruction

	W-NOMINATE Score								
	AL	AR	FL	GA	LA	MS	NC	SC	VA
Black Share × Troops	0.122	0.010	0.008	0.140	−0.253	0.161**	0.298**	0.326**	0.300**
	(0.173)	(0.067)	(0.095)	(0.273)	(0.259)	(0.081)	(0.147)	(0.108)	(0.086)
Black Share	−1.233**	0.890**	1.000*	−0.403	−0.108	1.317**	1.017**	0.860**	−0.971**
	(0.227)	(0.281)	(0.511)	(0.247)	(0.358)	(0.270)	(0.354)	(0.317)	(0.403)
Troops	−0.021	0.004	−0.019	−0.002	0.144	−0.036	−0.070	−0.161*	−0.152**
	(0.090)	(0.023)	(0.032)	(0.096)	(0.150)	(0.025)	(0.073)	(0.084)	(0.044)
Urban Share	−1.685**	2.594**	0.495	−0.838**	0.342	0.120	−0.082	1.415**	−0.609
	(0.398)	(0.690)	(0.376)	(0.378)	(1.215)	(0.829)	(0.495)	(0.493)	(0.579)
Population Density	5.810	−10.289	24.679	−1.094	−0.782	−7.507	−4.085	−18.998**	0.129
	(5.205)	(7.203)	(16.508)	(1.556)	(1.366)	(4.979)	(5.381)	(4.830)	(1.542)
Land Area	−0.360	−0.373	0.101*	−0.147	0.161*	−0.102	−0.753**	0.151	−0.244
	(0.235)	(0.253)	(0.053)	(0.264)	(0.092)	(0.196)	(0.272)	(0.123)	(0.326)
Mean Farm Value	0.280	0.096*	0.147**	−0.321**	0.202**	0.011	−0.050	0.271	−0.229**
	(0.225)	(0.050)	(0.068)	(0.163)	(0.038)	(0.021)	(0.188)	(0.170)	(0.068)
Constant	0.508**	−0.057	−1.301**	0.659**	−0.671**	−0.568**	0.074	−0.490**	1.255**
	(0.254)	(0.235)	(0.126)	(0.208)	(0.247)	(0.190)	(0.269)	(0.222)	(0.290)
Observations	100	89	75	110	90	119	116	122	86
Adjusted R^2	0.423	0.416	0.439	0.177	0.257	0.347	0.167	0.549	0.140

Note: Entries are zero regression coefficients with Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. *Troops* is the mean of troops per thousand in a county, *Population Density* is in 1000s per sq. mile, *Land Area* is in 1,000s of sq. miles, and *Mean Farm Value* is in 1,000s of 1870 dollars. Observations are at the legislator level. **p<0.05, *p<0.10 (two-tailed).