William G. Resh
Ralph and Goldy Lewis Hall 201D
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0626
Phone: (213) 821-7844
PhD in Public Administration and American Politics
Public Management, US presidency and executive politics, policy implementation, organization theory, personnel policy, organizational behavior
Bill Resh earned his doctoral degree at the American University’s School of Public Affairs in 2011. He was a tenure-track assistant professor in public management at Indiana University’s School of Public and Environmental Affairs from 2011 to 2014. Bill joined the University of Southern California’s Sol Price School of Public Policy in 2014. While his research covers a wide array of governance topics (e.g., executive politics, organization theory, street-level bureaucracy, goal conflict, and contracting), a common theme is how administrative structure, political environments, and inter- and intra-organizational relationships affect the decision calculus of the individuals within organizations tasked with public policy implementation.
He is the recipient of the 2012 Best Dissertation Award from the Academy of Management’s Public and Nonprofit Division, the American Political Science Association’s 2012 George C. Edwards III Award for Best Dissertation on the Presidency and Executive Politics, and the 2011 Paul A. Volcker Research Grant Award. His work has been published in respected peer reviewed journals and academic presses. Bill also has a book forthcoming under Johns Hopkins University Press. His book, Trust, Intellectual Capital and the Administrative Presidency: Appointee-Careerist Relations in the George W. Bush Administration and Beyond, explores appointee-careerist relations in the federal executive branch by systematically testing the premise that the trust established at the executive levels of federal agencies is critical to achieving performance and advancing presidential interests administratively. In this book, he develops hypotheses using combined strains of political and organizational theory to argue that these relations are critical to understanding which efforts at political control might harm agency performance.